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TAKING THE INITIATIVE: MARIJUANA LAW
REFORM AND DIRECT DEMOCRACY
Tamar Todd*
Abstract
Marijuana law reform has undergone a dramatic transformation in the
past 25 years since the passage of Proposition 215 in California in 1996,
which removed penalties for medical patients to use and cultivate
marijuana under California law. Prior to Proposition 215, no state
allowed for the use of marijuana in any manner under state law. Today,
marijuana is legal and regulated for medical use in 36 states and for all
adults 21 and older in 19 states.
This transformational shift in state marijuana law and policy would not
have happened but for the use of direct democracy, whereby voters can
gather signatures to place a proposed statute or constitutional amendment
on the ballot and vote on whether to enact the reform. By going directly to
the ballot on the issue of marijuana, voters in many states bypassed elected
officials’ opposition to popular reforms and forced a new approach to
marijuana policy.
Marijuana law reform has always had a close relationship with direct
democracy; the need to enact reform through the voter initiative process
has had a substantive impact on the scope and reach of legalization efforts.
But the success of this effort has now, particularly in conservative states,
impacted direct democracy itself. Lacking the ability to convince voters to
oppose marijuana law reform on its merits, lawmakers have taken to
attacking the process of direct democracy itself, and some courts have been
willing partners. State lawmakers have introduced and enacted legislation
in multiple states to make more difficult the process for voters to qualify
and succeed at the ballot. And in relation to the November 2020 general
election, several state supreme courts intervened to remove marijuana
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measures from state ballots, invalidate election results, and, in one
instance, eliminate direct democracy altogether.
This Essay first describes the essential role of ballot initiatives in
advancing marijuana law reform and the resulting backlash to the direct
democracy processes in states where there is entrenched institutional
opposition to reform. In these states, hostility to marijuana reform may
have lasting consequences for both marijuana reform and all other reform
efforts that have contemplated going directly to the voters, across the
ideological spectrum. This Essay analyzes this phenomenon through an
exploration of three recent instances of state supreme courts limiting
access to the ballot in response to marijuana reform efforts and the
potentially lasting damage these limitations will have on democracy.
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INTRODUCTION
The last two general election cycles have resulted in a national discourse
about the meaning, and value, of democracy in the United States.
Foundational questions about democracy have surfaced in the public
consciousness recently: Is our right to vote protected? Do the votes of
citizens of small states and large states have equal value? Are the
mechanics of our election processes functional? Can the results of a
validly held election be undone? Do the American people believe that our
elections are fair and that their votes matter?
The November 2020 general election generated a storm of controversy
and debate that focused primarily on the outcome of the 2020 Presidential
Election and the effort to undermine its results levied by former President
Trump and his allies. This has, in turn, led to efforts by many Republican
state legislatures to limit access to voting in their states,1 raising serious

1. See e.g., Nick Corasaniti, Georgia G.O.P. Passes Major Law to Limit Voting Amid
Nationwide Push, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 3, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/25/
us/politics/georgia-voting-law-republicans.html [https://perma.cc/B9DB-THEN]; Amy
Gardner, Kate Rabinowitz & Harry Stevens, How GOP-Backed Voting Measures Could
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concerns about the impact of these efforts on democracy. While the
spotlight is on national elected offices, including control of the presidency
and Congress, another threat to democracy has emerged, quietly but no less
perniciously. State legislatures and state courts in disagreement with laws
adopted directly by the voters are aggressively moving to reverse those
results, scuttling progressive reforms but even more fundamentally,
undermining confidence in election outcomes and removing a lever of
direct democracy that has existed for decades in many jurisdictions. In
short, the successful use of the ballot initiative process to advance
progressive causes has resulted in a curtailment of the democratic process.
And there is one issue that has particularly advanced this troubling trend:
hostility among conservative elected officials and judges to popular
marijuana law reform.
More than any other issue, voters have transformed marijuana law
through the initiative process. As early as the 1970s, municipal voters
adopted ordinances to direct law enforcement to treat marijuana as its
lowest law enforcement priority. In 1996, California voters removed state
law penalties for medical marijuana patients to use and produce marijuana
based on the recommendation of their physician.2 Voters followed suit in a
number of other states.3 Eventually, starting in 2012, voters started
removing state penalties for all adults and for the commercial production
and distribution of marijuana.4 Following these reforms, popular support

Create Hurdles for Tens of Millions of Voters, WASH. POST (Mar. 11, 2021),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/interactive/2021/voting-restrictions-republicansstates/ [https://perma.cc/K4N4-UWET]; Geoffrey Skelley, How the Republican Push to
Restrict Voting Could Affect Our Elections, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (May 17, 2021),
https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/how-the-republican-push-to-restrict-voting-could-affectour-elections/ [https://perma.cc/GH8V-TY28]; Matt Vasilogambros, Republican Wave of
Voting Restrictions Swells, PEW (Mar. 25, 2021), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/researchand-analysis/blogs/stateline/2021/03/25/republican-wave-of-voting-restrictions-swells
[https://perma.cc/3E94-PT8Q].
2. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (West 2021).
3. See Sarah Trumble & Nathan Kasai, America’s Marijuana Evolution, THIRD WAY
(Aug. 24, 2017), https://www.thirdway.org/report/americas-marijuana-evolution [https://
perma.cc/G46D-8RRX] (presenting a timeline of the enactment of medical marijuana ballot
initiatives in Alaska, Oregon, and Washington in 1998, Maine in 1999, and Colorado,
Hawaii, and Nevada in 2000).
4. See Jack Healy, Voters Ease Marijuana Laws in 2 States, but Legal Questions
Remain, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 7, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/08/us/
politics/marijuana-laws-eased-in-colorado-and-washington.html
[https://perma.cc/885DSP68]; see also Ray Sanchez & Michael Martinez, Colorado Pot Law Called Springboard
for Other States, CNN (Jan. 6, 2014, 10:29 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2014
/01/03/us/marijuana-laws-united-states/index.html [https://perma.cc/E7FS-7VAT]; Trumble
& Kasai, supra note 3.
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for marijuana legalization continued to increase nationwide,5 which
politically and practically undermined the continued federal prohibition of
marijuana and paved the way for other jurisdictions around the world to
reform their laws.6 To those who believe that the prohibition of marijuana
is a failed policy, borne of a drug war rooted in racism and resulting in the
unnecessary arrest and sanction of hundreds of thousands of people, this
story of direct democracy — first at the municipal level and then at the
state level — is a success story, and perhaps a model for other law reforms.
But not everyone was celebrating. Opposition to legal marijuana has
become the minority opinion in the United States,7 but it is a fierce
opposition, and it finds a home in conservative legislatures and courts.
This entrenched opposition has not succeeded at persuading voters of the
policy merits of marijuana prohibition. Efforts to defeat marijuana law
reforms based on policy arguments have generally failed.8 Opponents of
5. See generally Megan Brenan, Support for Legal Marijuana Inches up to New High
of 68%, GALLUP (Nov. 9, 2020), https://news.gallup.com/poll/323582/support-legalmarijuana-inches-new-high.aspx [https://perma.cc/4F4R-MDUW] (documenting the rise
since 2000 in public support for marijuana legalization across almost every demographic,
including an increase of 50% support to 68% support between 2011 and 2020); Frank
Newport, Record-High 50% of Americans Favor Legalizing Marijuana Use, GALLUP (Oct.
17, 2011), https://news.gallup.com/poll/150149/record-high-americans-favor-legalizingmarijuana.aspx [perma.cc/YB4G-H9WT] (documenting 50% of Americans supported
legalization of marijuana the year prior to the enactment of the first legalization ballot
initiative in 2012).
6. See generally Christopher Ingraham, How Marijuana Legalization in Colorado and
Washington Is Making the World a Better Place, WASH. POST (Oct. 17, 2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2014/10/17/how-marijuana-legalizationin-colorado-and-washington-is-making-the-world-a-better-place/ [perma.cc/Z3EL-BLFE];
Following Legalization in the US, Uruguay, Marijuana Gets Second Look, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR (Feb. 15, 2014), https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Latest-News-Wires/2014
/0215/Following-legalization-in-US-Uruguay-marijuana-gets-second-look [perma.cc/BN32QSJF].
7. See generally Brenan, supra note 5.
8. Since 2012, the overwhelming majority of marijuana legalization ballot measures
were enacted by voters despite arguments made by opposition campaigns. See, e.g.,
BARBARA K. CEGAVSKE, STATE OF NEV., STATEWIDE BALLOT QUESTIONS 2016 (2016),
https://www.nvsos.gov/sos/home/showdocument?id=4434 [https://perma.cc/9RLC-GCUF]
(posing as Question 2 an initiative to regulate and tax marijuana); Alaska Marijuana
Legalization, Ballot Measure 2, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Alaska_Marijuana
_Legalization,_Ballot_Measure_2_(2014) [https://perma.cc/8MNK-DXX3] (last visited
Feb. 16, 2022); Arizona Proposition 207, AZ. CTS. (2020), https://www.azcourts.gov/
prop207 [https://perma.cc/6XZV-HZJN] (last visited Feb. 16, 2022); Colorado Marijuana
Legalization
Initiative, Amendment 64,
BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/
Colorado_Marijuana_Legalization_Initiative,_Amendment_64_(2012)
[https://perma.cc
/N4RL-PZ9X] (last visited Feb. 16, 2022); Maine Marijuana Legalization, Question 1
(2016),
BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/Maine_Marijuana_Legalization,
_Question_1_(2016) [https://perma.cc/2WHY-GH5L] (last visited Feb. 16, 2022);
Massachusetts Marijuana Legalization,
Question
4 (2016),
BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/Massachusetts_Marijuana_Legalization,_Question_4_(2016)

2022]

TAKING THE INITIATIVE

557

marijuana reforms have made dire predictions about the potential
consequences of legalization, from a marijuana-related “drug use
epidemic,”9 to increased crime,10 to marijuana-induced harm and death.11
These dire forecasts have not materialized.12 In virtually every jurisdiction
[https://perma.cc/7BKE-SU5X] (last visited Feb. 16, 2022); Michigan Proposal 1,
Marijuana Legalization Initiative (2018), BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Mich
igan_Proposal_1,_Marijuana_Legalization_Initiative_(2018)
[https://perma.cc/TY5NDPYX] (last visited Feb. 16, 2022); Montana I-190, Marijuana Legalization Initiative
(2020), BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Michigan_Proposal_1,_Marijuana_Legal
ization_Initiative_(2018) [https://perma.cc/UZ8Z-NG6Z] (last visited Feb. 16, 2022); New
Jersey Public Question 1, Marijuana Legalization Amendment (2020), BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/New_Jersey_Public_Question_1,_Marijuana_
Legalization_Amendment_(2020) [https://perma.cc/SW2B-MABG] (last visited Feb. 16,
2022); Oregon Legalized Marijuana Initiative, Measure 91 (2014), BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/Oregon_Legalized_Marijuana_Initiative,_Measure_91_(2014)
[https://perma.cc/3G9S-NKDV] (last visited Feb. 16, 2022); South Dakota Constitutional
Amendment
A,
Marijuana
Legalization
Initiative
(2020),
BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/South_Dakota_Constitutional_Amendment_
A,_Marijuana_Legalization_Initiative_(2020) [https://perma.cc/L83B-QTL6] (last visited
Feb. 16, 2022); The Control, Regulate and Tax Adult Use of Marijuana Act: Proposition 64,
CA.GOV (May 7, 2021, 2:37 PM), https://post.ca.gov/proposition-64-the-control-regulateand-tax-adult-use-of-marijuana-act [https://perma.cc/3TX8-UZKP]; Washington Marijuana
Legalization
and
Regulation
Initiative
502,
BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/Washington_Marijuana_Legalization_and_
Regulation,_Initiative_502_(2012) [https://perma.cc/7BZE-97MD] (last visited Feb. 16,
2022). Two initiatives that failed were Arizona Proposition 2015 (2016) and Ohio Issue 3
(2015). See Arizona Marijuana Legalization, Proposition 205 (2016), BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/Arizona_Marijuana_Legalization,_Proposition_205_(2016)
[https://perma.cc/B9QB-LDTE] (last visited Feb. 16, 2022); see also Ohio Marijuana
Legalization Initiative, Issue 3 (2015), BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/
Ohio_Marijuana_Legalization_Initiative,_Issue_3_(2015) [https://perma.cc/X87R-UH85]
(last visited Feb. 16, 2022). For an example of the types of policy arguments typically made
by opponents to these ballot initiative campaigns, see Toolkit, SAM,
https://learnaboutsam.org/toolkit/ [https://perma.cc/82NK-FUNV] (last visited Feb. 3,
2022).
9. See David. W. Murray & John P. Walters, The Devastation That’s Really Happening
in Colorado, HUDSON INST. (July 10, 2014), https://www.hudson.org/research/10427-thedevastation-that-s-really-happening-in-colorado [perma.cc/ B8XY-9W3W].
10. See James Conklin, Moussa Diop & Herman Li, Contact High: The External Effects
of Retail Marijuana Establishments on House Prices, CATO INST. RSCH. BRIEFS (July 18,
2018),
https://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/research-brief-122.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6XSG-M9KX] (noting that “[a] primary concern of [marijuana
legalization] opponents is that legalizing marijuana will increase crime in local
communities”).
11. See Kevin A. Sabet, Opinion, SABET: Colorado Will Show Why Legalizing
Marijuana Is a Mistake, WASH. TIMES (Jan. 17, 2014), https://www.washingtontimes.
com/news/2014/jan/17/sabet-marijuana-legalizations-worst-enemy/
[https://perma.cc/NUD6-AMH6].
12. See, e.g., David J. Bier, How Legalizing Marijuana Is Securing the Border, CATO
INST. (Dec. 19, 2018), https://www.cato.org/policy-analysis/how-legalizing-marijuanasecuring-border-border-wall-drug-smuggling-lessons
[https://perma.cc/E49B-PFG3]
(finding “[s]tate-level marijuana legalization . . . has decreased the amount of drug
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that has reformed its marijuana laws, those reforms have resulted in
increased public acceptance of marijuana regulation and taxation, leading
persons who once opposed or seriously questioned such change to rethink
their positions and find common ground with reformers.13 Legalization has
boosted public support because the reforms, while perhaps not without
room for improvement, have resulted in a more effective allocation of
public resources, access to medicine by patients in need, a reduction in
racially-disproportionate policing, and the protection of personal liberty
and autonomy.
However, despite these overall positive policy results, many elected
officials and lawmakers, especially in the most conservative states, have
not given up. In light of the failure to persuade the voters in these states on
the merits, opponents have turned to restricting voters’ access to the ballot
to make it more difficult, if not impossible, to directly enact reforms. The
consequences of this attack on direct democracy are clear and immediate
for the future of marijuana reform in these jurisdictions but also threatening
to the enterprise of all voter-initiated law reform.
This Essay begins with a brief history of the role direct democracy has
played in the evolution of marijuana law reform. This was a role borne out
of necessity, because popular support for reform has always far outpaced
the will of elected officials. The Essay then provides case studies of this
phenomenon from Nebraska, South Dakota, and Mississippi. During the
2020 election cycle, state supreme courts in each of these states either

smuggling into the United States across the southwest border”); Angela Dills et al., The
Effect of State Marijuana Legalizations: 2021 Update, CATO INST. (Feb 2, 2021),
https://www.cato.org/policy-analysis/effect-state-marijuana-legalizations-2021-update
[https://perma.cc/8W6S-J4L2] (“Reviews of the literature on the first wave of marijuana
decriminalizations in the 1970s note that marijuana use did not change in response to
relaxed restrictions.”); Benjamin Hansen, Keaton S. Miller & Caroline Weber, Early
Evidence on Recreational Legalization and Traffic Fatalities, CATO INST. (Aug. 8, 2018),
https://www.cato.org/research-briefs-economic-policy/early-evidence-recreationalmarijuana-legalization-traffic [https://perma.cc/R5V9-Z9QL] (finding that “since legalizing
marijuana, Colorado and Washington have not experienced significantly different rates of
marijuana- or alcohol-related traffic fatalities”).
13. See, e.g., Patricia Calhoun, John Hickenlooper, Three More Governors with Legal
Pot Send Letter to Jeff Sessions, WESTWORD (Apr. 3, 2017, 2:05 PM),
https://www.westword.com/marijuana/governors-of-four-states-with-legal-marijuana-sendletter-to-sessions-mnuchin-8936843
[https://perma.cc/R5VF-BSZM]
(reporting
the
governors informed the U.S. Attorney General of their “apprehensions before our states
adopted current laws,” but voiced full support for those laws); Ashley Killough, Fiery
Senate Speech on Pot Spotlights GOP Sen. Cory Gardner, CNN (Jan. 5, 2018, 6:28 PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2018/01/05/politics/cory-gardner-marijuana-laws
[https://perma.cc/X6Z7-9B6G] (noting Republican Senator Gardner of Colorado opposed
legalizing marijuana in 2012 but now staunchly supports Colorado’s law). See generally
Brenan, supra note 5 (documenting the steep rise since 2000 in public support for marijuana
legalization across almost every demographic).
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removed a popular marijuana-related measure from the ballot or overturned
the results of a validly held election. They did so, as this Essay suggests, in
a transparent effort to halt, or at least slow, the pace of marijuana law
reform in their respective states.
The Essay concludes with a warning that the implications and
consequences of these judicial interventions are far-reaching. Certainly,
limiting citizens’ ability to place legislation directly on the ballot will slow
the adoption of new marijuana laws in these states by limiting voters’
ability to bypass their elected lawmakers in areas of policy where they
disagree. But the implications extend beyond marijuana. The efforts to
prevent marijuana law reform are changing the playing field for direct
democracy altogether, making it more difficult for voters to reach the ballot
on any issue. By undoing election results and invalidating legislation
supported and enacted by voters, these state supreme court decisions
threaten to further undermine confidence in democracy and our elections
process altogether, at a time when voter confidence is already at an all-time
low.
I. CIRCUMVENTING ELECTED OFFICIALS VIA DIRECT DEMOCRACY
Every election cycle, voters in many states across the country, in
addition to voting for their representation in government, participate
directly in policymaking by voting whether to adopt or reject constitutional
amendments, state legislation, or municipal ordinances on a wide variety of
issues. Ballot initiatives allow voters to bypass elected representatives to
enact laws directly.14 In fact, many successful initiatives are the product of
disagreement between voters and state lawmakers over how to address a
particular policy issue.15
Direct democracy is a central component of lawmaking in many states.
Twenty-four states have had at least one statewide initiative pass between

14. See Initiative and Referendum Process, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Jan. 4,
2022), https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/initiative-and-referendumprocesses.aspx [https://perma.cc/HA6X-7FGU] (“The citizen initiative process enables
citizens to bypass their state legislature by placing proposed statutes and, in some states,
constitutional amendments on the ballot.”).
15. Medicaid expansion is one recent example of the phenomena. See Philip Rocco,
Direct Democracy and the Fate of Medicaid Expansion, 1 JAMA HEALTH F. e200934
(2020) (“In this partisan atmosphere, ballot initiatives have emerged as an important
mechanism to expand Medicaid in states where governors or state legislatures oppose it.
This allows voters to engage in conflict expansion, transforming the decision from an
interpartisan squabble among elected officials into a referendum on a broadly popular
benefit.”).
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1904 and 2018.16 Both progressive17 and conservative18 reform movements
have used ballot initiatives since the later 1970s to advance their agendas,
starting with Proposition 13 in California, which severely capped property
taxes.
The ballot initiative process holds, for some, a romantic notion of a
populist form of pure democracy. Ordinary people whose needs are not
being acted on by those in power can come together with an idea for a law,
collect signatures from other voters to place that idea on the ballot, and
change the law themselves — regardless of whether their elected
lawmakers agree.19 It can and has been used as a means to build
movements and civil engagement to develop the infrastructure necessary to
develop political and organizing power.20
Others believe the initiative process suffers from many of the same
factors that corrupt legislatures in terms of the power and influence of
money and lobbying. Private interests fund costly ballot initiative
campaigns, with targeted, well-funded, political advertising.21 Private

16. See INITIATIVE & REFERENDUM INST., INITIATIVE USE (2019), http://
www.iandrinstitute.org/docs/IRI-Initiative-Use-(2019-2).pdf
[https://perma.cc/LN4BFEP5].
17. For example, ballot initiatives focused on expansion of rights, minimum wage,
Medicaid expansion, death with dignity, and criminal justice reform. See Who We Are,
BALLOT INITIATIVE STRATEGY CTR., https://ballot.org/who-we-are/ [https://perma.cc/7Y66NZL9] (last visited Feb. 3, 2022) (“[W]e work to transform our country into one that is
equitable and just. In our work, we strive to challenge structural racism, and center the
people most impacted.”).
18. For example, ballot initiatives focused on restricting labor rights, restricting
abortion, tax reform, and same sex marriage (voters approved 34 of 35 measures banning
same-sex marriage between 1998 and 2006). See INITIATIVE & REFERENDUM INST.,
BALLOTWATCH (2016), http://www.iandrinstitute.org/docs/BW%202016-1%20Preview%
202016-09-291.pdf [https://perma.cc/BL8T-HBWZ].
19. See generally JOHN G. MATSUSAKA, LET THE PEOPLE RULE: HOW DIRECT
DEMOCRACY CAN MEET THE POPULIST CHALLENGE (2020) (putting forth the argument that
direct democracy can be used to address the disconnect between people and their elected
officials).
20. See What We Stand For, BALLOT INITIATIVE STRATEGY CTR., https://ballot.org/whatwe-stand-for/ [https://perma.cc/U4ZM-452J] (last visited Feb. 3, 2022) (“We believe in
movement building and empowerment, bringing communities into the work and leaving
lasting infrastructure for continued social change.”).
21. For example, private individuals, corporations, and interest groups spent more than
$785 million on 12 ballot initiatives in California in 2020. See, e.g., Ryan Menezes, Maloy
Moore & Phi Do, Billions Have Been Spent on California’s Ballot Measure Battles. But
This Year Is Unlike Any Other, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 13, 2020), https://www.la
times.com/projects/props-california-2020-election-money/ [https://perma.cc/VFV6-NPGT];
Reid Wilson, Corporations, Interest Groups Spend Fortunes on Ballot Measures, HILL
(Sept. 1, 2018, 4:16 PM), https://thehill.com/business-a-lobbying/404555-corporationsinterest-groups-spend-fortunes-on-ballot-measures [https://perma.cc/UR6P-GZVW].
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interests often draft the legislation behind closed doors, without the benefit
of a deliberative process.22
Either way, voters have a long history of participating in the initiative
process23 to embrace or reject policy and directly decide how our
constitutions and laws should be crafted. And they have repeatedly done so
in ways that significantly part course with their representative government
when it disagrees or fails to act on in an area that voters care about.24
II. MARIJUANA LAW REFORM THROUGH DIRECT DEMOCRACY
There is no other area of law that has been as dramatically shaped and
recreated by the ballot initiative process as marijuana.25 With marijuana, to

22. For example, there is a significant difference in the detail, scope, and policy of focus
of marijuana legalization laws enacted by voters and the ballot (See for example,
Amendment 64 in Colorado (2012), Measure 91 in Oregon (2014), and Proposal 1 in
Michigan (2018)) and the laws enacted thus far by state legislatures, such as in Illinois, New
York, New Mexico, and Virginia. The law enacted legislatively generally provide more
extensive reparative justice provisions, investment in communities most harmed by
marijuana criminalization, and broader civil legal protections. This is the result of many
factors, but one is the mechanism that the legislative process provides to debate and
negotiation, the power of Black and Brown caucuses, and stronger avenues for minority
voices to influence the substance of legislation.
23. See INITIATIVE & REFERENDUM INST., supra note 16 (documenting the 2,610 statelevel initiatives on the ballot from 1904 to 2019).
24. See, e.g., Brady Dennis & David Weigel, From Medicaid to Minimum Wage, Even
Red State Voters Backed Progressive Measures, WASH. POST (Nov. 7, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/from-medicaid-to-minimumwage-even-red-state-voters-backed-progressive-measures/2018/11/07/b0b61572-e2bc-11e8ab2c-b31dcd53ca6b_story.html [https://perma.cc/3QV4-CRD8].
25. A number of jurisdictions around the world have replaced, or have started the
process to replace, complete criminal prohibition of marijuana with a system of legal,
regulated access by medical patients and, in some cases, adult consumers. But the use of the
ballot initiative process to effectuate this change in policy is unique to the United States. In
all jurisdictions, the reform efforts were led either by elected lawmakers or the courts.
Uruguay legalized marijuana legislatively in 2013 in an effort led by its then President José
“Pepe” Mujica. See Noah Rayman, Uruguay First Country to Legalize Marijuana Industry,
TIME (Dec. 10, 2013), https://world.time.com/2013/12/10/uruguay-poised-to-be-firstcountry-to-legalize-marijuana-industry/ [https://perma.cc/2J53-A4TD]. Canada followed
suit legalizing and regulating for adult consumer in 2018 and fulfilling Prime Minister Justin
Trudeau’s 2015 campaign pledge to legalize marijuana in Canada. See Ian Austen, Trudeau
Unveils Bill Legalizing Recreational Marijuana in Canada, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 13, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/13/world/canada/trudeau-marijuana.html
[https://perma.cc/7Q4X-765Y]. And the Supreme Courts of several other nations have
loosened marijuana restrictions for adult marijuana users, including in South Africa,
Mexico, and the Democratic Republic of Georgia. See Chris Roberts, Georgia’s High Court
Removes Marijuana Possession Penalties, MARIJUANA MOMENT (July 30, 2018),
https://www.marijuanamoment.net/georgias-high-court-removes-marijuana-possessionpenalties/ [https://perma.cc/REZ9-7N3Y]; Mexico Marijuana: Top Court Decriminalises
Recreational Use of Cannabis, BBC NEWS (June 29, 2021), https://www.bbc.com
/news/world-latin-america-57645016 [https://perma.cc/59FU-M86N]; South Africa’s
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put it simply, the voters and their elected officials disagree. The last
several decades have seen a seismic shift in attitudes towards marijuana by
voters,26 which was not, until very recently, matched by a shift in attitude
by their elected lawmakers.27 This mismatch in opinion resulted in voters
employing the ballot initiative process to reject the existing prohibitions on
marijuana in favor of trying something new.28
Dramatic departures from a prohibitionist approach to marijuana policy
are not unique to the United States, but the use of the ballot initiative
process to effectuate the change is. A number of jurisdictions around the
world have replaced, or have started the process to replace, complete
criminal prohibition of marijuana with a system of legal, regulated access

Highest Court Legalizes Cannabis Use, BBC NEWS (Sept. 18, 2018),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-45559954 [https://perma.cc/M7K6-SZZC]. One
outlier to this is New Zealand where the legislature placed a ballot measure legalizing
marijuana on the ballot in 2020 that was rejected by the voters. See Yan Zhuang, New
Zealand Voters Approve Euthanasia but Reject Recreational Marijuana, N.Y. TIMES (Mar.
25,
2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/30/world/asia/new-zealand-euthanasiamarijuana.html [https://perma.cc/P5QQ-P5MW].
26. See Brenan, supra note 5 (“Gallup first measured the public’s views of marijuana
legalization in 1969, when 12% of Americans backed it; by 1977, support had more than
doubled to 28%. It did not exceed 30% until 2000 but has risen steeply in the two decades
since then, and is now twice what it was in 2001 and 2003.”).
27. The recent shift in support by elected officials is largely among Democrats. See
David Weigel, The Trailer: Democrats Say Legalizing Weed Is Good Policy — and Good
Politics,
WASH.
POST
(Feb.
23,
2021,
6:14
PM),
https://www.
washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/02/23/trailer-democrats-say-legalizing-weed-is-goodpolicy-good-politics/ [https://perma.cc/H2C8-8BKB] (“Legalization, which both Democrats
and Republicans treated carefully just a few years ago, has quickly become more popular
than either party. But its political support is mostly concentrated among Democrats, and the
party increasingly sees it as an issue that can drive out voters.”); Giovanni Russonello, The
Country’s Evolving Marijuana Debate, N.Y. TIMES (July 14, 2021), https://www.nytimes.
com/2021/04/20/us/politics/marijuana-democrats.html
[https://perma.cc/WM4Q-X986].
Vice President Kamala Harris provides one example of a lawmaker’s shifting attitude on
marijuana. In 2010, as a prosecutor, she co-authored an official voter guide argument
opposing a marijuana legalization measure on the California ballot that year and in 2014 she
laughed off a reporter’s question about whether she supported marijuana legalization. See
Kyle Jaeger, Where Vice Presidential Candidate Kamala Harris Stands on Marijuana,
MARIJUANA MOMENT (Aug. 12, 2020), https://www.marijuanamoment.net/where-vicepresidential-candidate-kamala-harris-stands-on-marijuana/ [https://perma.cc/8MVB-U8LT].
But by 2019 she sponsored legislation to federally deschedule marijuana and made
marijuana law reform a prominent component of her 2020 presidential primary campaign.
See id.
28. See Michael Pollan, The Pot Proposition; Living with Medical Marijuana, N.Y.
TIMES MAG. (July 20, 1997), https://www.nytimes.com/1997/07/20/magazine/living-withmedical-marijuana.html [https://perma.cc/YHK7-WHCD] (“The passage of Proposition 215
marks the end of ‘Just say no’ — and the beginning of Americans saying a great many other
things about drugs. It is a conversation that the war on drugs may not survive.”).
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by medical patients and, in some cases, adult consumers.29 In other
countries, elected lawmakers or the courts led these efforts, not voters.30
In the United States, however, the transformation of marijuana policy
over the last 30 years is due, nearly entirely,31 to citizens’ power to directly
access the ballot to side-step reluctant lawmakers and rewrite the laws. The
marijuana reform movement began in 1991 when Dennis Peron, an AIDS
activist in San Francisco who was frustrated that AIDS patients lacked
access to marijuana to ease their suffering, joined efforts with other local
activists to write a local ballot initiative.32 Proposition P demanded that the
city of San Francisco request that the California Legislature add marijuana
to its list of approved medicines to treat various illnesses, including AIDS,
and to not punish doctors who recommended it to their patients.33 It
succeeded with 80% of the vote and was followed the next year by the San
Francisco Board of Supervisors’ adoption of Resolution 141-92 on August

29. See Cannabis Legalization in Canada, One Year On, TRANSFORM DRUG POL’Y
FOUND. (Oct. 1, 2019), https://transformdrugs.org/publications/cannabis-legalisation-incanada-one-year-on [https://perma.cc/PDQ6-M2M4]; see also Cannabis Legalization in
Mexico: An Explainer, TRANSFORM DRUG POL’Y FOUND. (Mar. 23, 2021), https://trans
formdrugs.org/blog/cannabis-legalisation-in-mexicoan-explainer
[https://perma.cc/7ELLJ5ZU]; Cannabis Legalization in Uruguay: Public Health and Safety over Private Profit,
TRANSFORM DRUG POL’Y FOUND. (Nov. 20, 2018), https://transformdrugs.org/blog/cannabislegalisation-in-uruguay-public-health-and-safety-over-private-profit
[https://perma.cc/26YU-U9BQ].
30. One outlier to this pattern is New Zealand where the legislature placed a ballot
measure legalizing marijuana on the ballot in 2020 that was rejected by the voters. See
Zhuang, supra note 25.
31. In the 1970s a number of states “decriminalized” marijuana, meaning that they
removed jail time for minor marijuana offenses or reclassified such offense to be infractions
rather than misdemeanors, including California (1976), Colorado (1975), Maine (1976),
Minnesota (1976), Mississippi (1977), Nebraska (1977), New York (1977), North Carolina
(1977), Ohio (1976), and Oregon (1973). See EMILEE MOONEY SCOTT, OFF. OF LEG. RSCH.,
CONN. GEN. ASSEMBLY, 2010-R-0204, MARIJUANA DECRIMINALIZATION (2010),
http://www.antoniocasella.eu/archila/Mooney-Scott_2010.pdf [https://perma.cc/3MJF-VU
8W]. But under these laws, marijuana was still prohibited for any purpose under state laws
and, in some cases, led to increased enforcement.
32. See Jordan Heller, From Drug War to Dispensaries: An Oral History of Weed
Legalization’s First Wave, N.Y. MAG. (Nov. 14, 2018), https://nymag.com/intelligencer
/2018/11/marijuana-legalizations-first-wave-an-oral-history.html
[https://perma.cc/LU9J27BK] (interviewing Dale Gieringer, director of California NORML and co-author of
Proposition 215 stating that “‘91 was also when the medical marijuana movement started,
when Dennis Peron . . . and a bunch of his comrades put Proposition P on the San Francisco
ballot. It was a symbolic because it was just a city initiative. But it was the first victory the
marijuana reform movement had scored since the 1970s”)
33. See Richard Sandomir, Dennis Peron, Early Medical Marijuana Advocate, Dies at
71, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 30, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/30/obituaries/dennisperon-early-medical-marijuana-advocate-dies-at-71.html [https://perma.cc/L3UD-DBRX].
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28, 1992.34 Resolution 141-92 urged the state to allow for medical access
under Proposition P and directed the district attorney and the police to
make enforcement of medical marijuana the lowest priority for law
enforcement within the city and county.35
In 1996, building upon the local success of Resolution 141-92, Peron
and other activists wrote and successfully placed Proposition 215 on the
California ballot to remove state-law criminal penalties for the personal use
and cultivation of marijuana pursuant to a doctor’s recommendation.36 On
November 5, 1996,37 California voters enacted the statute with over 55%
support, despite strong opposition from state elected officials. For
example, then-Attorney General Dan Lungren declared Proposition 215 a
“disaster” and “an unprecedented mess.”38 Notwithstanding the near
unanimous opposition to the change from California’s elected lawmakers
and complete federal prohibition, voters amended the California statute to
remove penalties for medical marijuana use under state law.
The picture at the federal level is more complicated. There is no federal
ballot initiative process, so voters cannot directly change federal law. As a
result, despite nationwide polling showing strong support for legalization

34. Proposition P (November 1991), MARIJUANA LIBR., http://www.marijuana
library.org/Proposition_P_Nov_1991.html [https://perma.cc/3V4T-Y2LL] (last visited Feb.
16, 2022).
35. See id.
36. See Sandomir, supra note 33.
37. California Proposition 215, Medical Marijuana Initiative (1996), BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/California_Proposition_215,_Medical_Marijuana_Initiative_(1996)
[https://perma.cc/2L3V-UPX9] (last visited Jan. 18, 2022). Arizona voters enacted a similar
measure, Proposition 200, during this same election allowing doctors to prescribe marijuana
to seriously ill patients. See Arizona Use or Possession of Controlled Substances,
Proposition 200 (1996), BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Arizona_Use_or_Possession_
of_Controlled_Substances,_ Proposition_200_(1996) [https://perma.cc/DVZ2-2JVS] (last
visited Jan. 18, 2022). However, a doctor’s ability to prescribe controlled substances is
federally controlled and the prescription of marijuana was not allowed making the Arizona
initiative symbolic. Arizona voters subsequently enacted an effective medical marijuana
initiative. See Arizona Medical Marijuana Question, Proposition 203 (2010), BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/Arizona_Medical_Marijuana_Question,_Proposition_203_(2010)
[https://perma.cc/VM92-HS82] (last visited Jan 18, 2022).
38. See John Balzar, Voters Approve Measure to Use Pot as Medicine, L.A. TIMES
(Nov. 6, 1996, 12:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1996-11-06-mn62740-story.html [https://perma.cc/J2YS-RKGU]; see also 21 U.S.C. §§ 829, 841, 844
(banning prohibited substances, including marijuana, under federal law).
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across demographics and party lines,39 marijuana remains almost
completely prohibited by federal law.40
That said, despite voters’ inability to change federal law through direct
democracy, their use of the ballot initiative process at the state and local
level has worked to significantly depart from and undermine federal law.
Between 1973 and 1978, 11 states decriminalized the possession or use of
small amounts of marijuana.41 By the 1990s, starting with Measure P42 and
in the face of mounting scientific evidence pointing to marijuana’s
medicinal benefits, voters began enacting measures to legalize marijuana
under state law.43 These reforms adopted by voters have been met with
considerable success,44 leading voters in other states to advocate for the
adoption of similar reforms in their states. Additionally, in a majority of
states, changes have occurred notwithstanding “the shadow of a strict

39. See Brenan, supra note 5 (“Gallup first measured the public’s views of marijuana
legalization in 1969, when 12% of Americans backed it; by 1977, support had more than
doubled to 28%. It did not exceed 30% until 2000 but has risen steeply in the two decades
since then, and is now twice what it was in 2001 and 2003.”).
40. The possession, use, and distribution of marijuana is controlled at the federal level
through the Controlled Substances Act (CSA), which classifies drugs into one of five
“schedules” (i.e., categories) depending upon their medicinal value, potential for abuse, and
psychological and physical effects on the body. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 811–812. Congress placed
marijuana into Schedule I, which is the most severely restricted category. 21 C.F.R. § 1308.11
(2022). To be listed on Schedule I, a drug must have “no currently accepted medical use” and “a
high potential for abuse.” 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(1). Among those drugs listed on Schedule II,
which are less restricted than marijuana, are cocaine, codeine, oxycodone, and
methamphetamine. 21 C.F.R. §§ 1308.1112 (2022). The federal government bans the
manufacture, distribution, and possession of Schedule I drugs, including marijuana. Id. §
1308.11.
41. See generally CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11357 (West 1975); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 18-18-406(1) (West 2021); ME. STAT. tit. 22 § 2383(1-A) (West 2018); MINN. STAT.
§ 152.027(a) (2022); MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-29-139(c)(2) (West 2022); NEB. REV. STAT. §
28-416(13) (West 2022); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-95(d) (West 2022); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§2925.11(C)(3) (West 2022); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 221.05 (McKinney 2022) (repealed 2021);
OR. REV. STAT. § 475.864(3) (2022) (repealed 2017); Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494 (Alaska
1975).
42. Measure P was a 1991 ballot initiative in San Francisco that called on the state of
California to permit medical cannabis.
43. See, e.g., Igor Grant et al., Medical Marijuana: Clearing Away the Smoke, 6 OPEN
NEUROLOGY J. 18, 23–24 (2012); INST. OF MED., MARIJUANA & MEDICINE: ASSESSING THE
SCIENCE BASE (Janet E. Joy et al. eds., 1999). See generally State Medical Cannabis Laws,
NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Feb. 3, 2022), https://www.ncsl.org/research/health/statemedical-marijuana-laws.aspx [https://perma.cc/58JW-XUJN] (noting that as of 2021, 36
states and four territories have authorized marijuana for medical use).
44. See Kyle Jaeger, Most People in Recreational Marijuana States Believe Legalization
Is a Success, Poll Finds, MARIJUANA MOMENT (May 13, 2020), https://www.marijuana
moment.net/most-people-in-recreational-marijuana-states-believe-legalization-is-a-successpoll-finds/ [https://perma.cc/TXU3-CV4W] (reporting on a survey documenting that most
people who live in states that have legalized marijuana for adult use broadly feel that the
policy is successful).
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federal ban on the drug.”45 Such cascading state marijuana reform has
transformed the legal landscape in this area.
Furthermore, in states that lack access to a statewide ballot initiative
process or where there are financial or other barriers to accessing a statelevel ballot initiative process,46 voters have employed local initiative
processes to change city and country ordinances that address marijuana
offenses and enforcement.47 For example, in Ohio, voters in 22 cities have
approved municipal reforms to decriminalize marijuana.48 In four West
Virginia cities and four South Carolina cities, local campaigns organized to
enact decriminalization ordinances in 2021.49
III. THE MARIJUANA-DRIVEN DIRECT DEMOCRACY BACKLASH
State lawmakers and state courts have turned to attacking the ballot
initiative process itself in response to voters adopting progressive initiatives
that advance popular reforms. While state ballot initiative law sets forth a
path for citizens to place legislation directly on the ballot, the state
legislature often controls critical elements of the process that the citizens
must follow to do so.50 Depending on the state, lawmakers often control

45. See Robert A. Mikos, The Evolving Federal Response to State Marijuana, 26
WIDENER L. REV. 1, 2–3 (2020).
46. Drug policy reformers have used municipal level initiatives to advance broader drug
policy reform, in addition to marijuana. For example, voters in a number of cities have
recently decriminalized psychedelics through local referenda. See Kyle Jaeger, Psychedelics
Decriminalization Advancing in Three More Cities, Spanning from Coast to Coast,
MARIJUANA MOMENT (Aug. 3, 2021), https://www.marijuanamoment.net/psychedelicsdecriminalization-advancing-in-three-more-cities-spanning-from-coast-to-coast/
[https://perma.cc/D6H5-QL56].
47. For an overview of the nearly 100 localities that have enacted municipal laws or
resolutions to either fully or partially decriminalizing minor cannabis possession offenses,
see Local Decriminalization, NORML, https://norml.org/laws/local-decriminalization/
[https://perma.cc/Z5KL-VWR4] (last visited Feb. 6, 2022).
48. See Kyle Jaeger, Local Marijuana Decriminalization Efforts Launch in Ohio, South
Carolina, and West Virginia, MARIJUANA MOMENT (June 14, 2021), https://www.marijuana
moment.net/local-marijuana-decriminalization-efforts-launch-in-ohio-south-carolina-andwest-virginia/ [https://perma.cc/PBR9-EDWY].
49. See id.
50. For a state-by-state list of initiative processes, see State I&R, INITIATIVE &
REFERENDUM INST., http://www.iandrinstitute.org/states.cfm [https://perma.cc/JF8F-EEKM]
(last visited Feb. 16, 2022). See also IDAHO CONST. art. III, § 1 (setting forth the initiative
right (“The people reserve to themselves the power to propose laws, and enact the same at
the polls independent of the legislature”), but allowing the legislature to establish the
process (“under such conditions and in such a manner as may be provided by acts of the
legislature”)); Elaine S. Povich, Lawmakers Strike Back Against Voter-Approved Ballot
Measures, PEW (July 28, 2017), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs
/stateline/2017/07/28/lawmakers-strike-back-against-voter-approved-ballot-measures
[https://perma.cc/CJ3A-BCY3] (“Many state legislatures also took steps to rein in future
ballot initiatives. According to Ballotpedia, 186 bills were introduced [in 2017] concerning
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who can collect signatures, how the signatures must be collected, the
timeline for submission, the subject matter that can be considered, and the
printing and verification requirements.51 These may appear to be mundane
operational details, but they can be exploited to convert a simple and
accessible process to one that is nearly impossible to successfully navigate.
While voters in some states have a right to citizen initiative to bypass state
lawmakers, the mechanics of that process and how difficult that right is to
exercise is up to those very same lawmakers.52 In 2021, there were over
100 ballot measure process bills moving through 40 state legislatures.53
In recent years, progressive movements that have leveraged wins
through ballot initiatives to bypass Republican-controlled legislatures,
including enacting minimum wage laws, restoring voting rights, legalizing
marijuana, and adopting Medicaid expansion, have spurred a backlash to
ballot initiatives in a number of Republican-controlled states.54
Successful marijuana reform initiatives have prompted some of the most
aggressive rollbacks of direct democracy. For example, in 2020, in
response to a medical marijuana initiative circulating to qualify for the
ballot in Idaho,55 state lawmakers opposed to medical marijuana sought to
pass a joint resolution to amend the Idaho Constitution to prohibit the
enactment of any state law that would remove state law penalties for any
psychoactive controlled substance unless it is prescribed and dispensed in
accordance with federal law.56 Idaho only allows voters to enact legislation

changes to the initiative process in 33 states . . . . Those bills added or lifted restrictions on
the process, changed campaign finance rules, and added supermajority requirements, among
other provisions.”).
51. See, e.g., Laws Governing the Imitative Process in Florida, BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/Laws_governing_the_initiative_process_in_Florida
[https://perma.cc/2YYM-E9BW] (last visited Jan. 14, 2022).
52. There are constitutional limits on how far a legislation can go in restricting access to
the ballot. See Reclaim Idaho v. Denney, 497 P.3d 160, 183 (Idaho 2021) (“The ability of
the legislature to make laws related to a fundamental right arises from the reality that, in an
ordered society, few rights are absolute. However, the legislature’s duty to give effect to the
people’s rights is not a free pass to override constitutional constraints and legislate a right
into non-existence, even if the legislature believes doing so is in the people’s best interest.”).
53. For an overview of proposed legislative changes in 2021 governing ballot measures,
see Changes in 2021 to Laws Governing Ballot Measures, BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/Changes_in_2021_to_laws_governing_ballot_measures
[https://perma.cc/74BS-GQWW] (last visited Jan. 14, 2022).
54. See Reid J. Epstein & Nick Corasaniti, Republicans Move to Limit a Grass–Roots
Tradition of Direct Democracy, N.Y. TIMES (May 22, 2021), https://
www.nytimes.com/2021/05/22/us/politics/republican-ballot-initiatives-democrats.html
[https://perma.cc/K79D-XM6S]. For example, in 2016 four minimum wage laws —
Arizona, Colorado, Maine, and Washington — were enacted via ballot initiative. See id.
55. This measure likely would have qualified for the ballot but for COVID-19 derailing
the signature gathering process.
56. S.J. Res. 101, 66th Leg., 1st Sess. (Idaho 2021).
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through a ballot initiative, not to amend the state constitution.57 Thus, this
proposed amendment would have the effect of locking in the prohibitions
created by existing drug laws in Idaho and removing the subject entirely
from the purview of the voters to legislate in this area, thereby preventing
the enactment of marijuana reform legislation.58
The South Dakota Legislature requires that each petition be contained on
a single piece of paper.59 The sheets can be several feet wide and tall for
complicated measures, known as the “beach-towel effect.”60 In response to
a 2020 medical marijuana initiative trying to navigate this requirement by
printing the language in 6-point font, the Legislature changed state law to
require each initiative to be printed in 14-point font on a single sheet of
paper.61 Additionally, the Legislature changed the law to require that
initiatives that raise taxes and fees, or require more than $10 million in
spending, obtain 60% of the vote to pass.62
The motives behind many of the proposed reforms are not secret.
During a debate on one of the South Dakota bills, Republican
Representative Steven Haugaard of Sioux Falls frankly acknowledged that
he is opposed to citizens making their own laws: “We started out as a
republic . . . . Sadly, we’re tending in the direction of a democracy. And
that democracy was only intended to be going to the polls to vote for your
elected representative.”63 Put bluntly by Reynold Nesiba, one of three

57. IDAHO CONST. art. III, § 1.
58. There are also examples of push back against local ordinances. In 2011, Missoula
County prosecutor Fred Van Valkenburg convinced the state legislature to attempt to thwart
the will of voters by passing a bill, HB 39, saying that a local initiative cannot determine
local police priorities. See Gwen Florio, Missoula County Attorneys Attempt to Override
Marijuana Initiative Creates Uproar, BILLINGS GAZETTE (Jan. 30, 2011),
https://billingsgazette.com/news/state-and-regional/montana/missoula-county-attorneysattempt-to-override-marijuana-initiative-creates-uproar/article_f5e32ab0-e42b-5528-b7f1ded1958bdf26.html [https://perma.cc/6VYF-FD6X].
59. See S.D. SEC’Y OF STATE, HOW TO SUBMIT AND CIRCULATE A 2022 STATEWIDE
INITIATED MEASURE OR CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT PETITION (2022), https://sdsos.gov/
elections-voting/assets/HowToCirculate2022BQPetition.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9NNZ-ZX
2W]; see also Seth Tupper, Republican–Backed Bills Complicate Citizen Lawmaking, S.D.
PUB. BROAD. (Mar. 11, 2021, 1:42 PM), https://listen.sdpb.org/news/2021-03-11/republicanbacked-bills-complicate-citizen-lawmaking [https://perma.cc/6ZVQ-26PM] (“The Secretary
of State’s Office says the full text of a petition and its signature lines must be contained on a
single sheet of paper. For complex proposals, those single sheets of paper may grow to
several feet wide and tall.”).
60. See Tupper, supra note 59.
61. S. Res. 77, 96th Leg., Legis. Sess. (S.D. 2021) (requiring certain font size for
initiative measure petitions and constitutional amendment petitions).
62. H.R.J. Res. 5003, 96th Leg., Legis. Sess. (S.D. 2021) (submitting to the voters at the
next primary election and new constitutional amendment requiring for initiatives or
legislatively propose constitutional amendment).
63. See Tupper, supra note 59.
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Democrats in the 35-member South Dakota State Senate, “Republicans
have every statewide office, 85 percent of the Legislature and every
constitutional office. The one place where Democrats can make progress is
through the initiated measure process, and the Republicans want to take
that away, too.”64
But the Legislature is not the only branch of state government where, in
some states, the citizen initiative process is under attack. In states that have
held off reforming their marijuana laws due to entrench opposition by
elected officials, a number of state courts, particularly in instances where
citizens seek to amend the state constitution to change marijuana laws,
have intervened to remove the option from the ballot or to invalidate
election results.
This Essay now turns to three case studies, examinations of state
supreme court decisions in Nebraska,65 South Dakota,66 and Mississippi,67
following successful marijuana initiatives on the November 2020 ballot.68
These decisions received local media attention but flew far below the
national popular and even legal media radar. Yet, they are prime examples
of the way in which conservative state courts are moving to aggressively
beat back marijuana law reform efforts and, in the process, weaken, or in
some cases even dismantle altogether, the direct democracy process.
A. Case Study: Nebraska
Nebraska is one of a few remaining states that lacks an effective medical
marijuana program.69 Despite being one of the first states to decriminalize
simple marijuana to a civil infraction for a first offense in the late 1970s,70
state lawmakers have failed to enact any meaningful marijuana law reform

64. See Epstein & Corasaniti, supra note 54.
65. State ex rel. Wagner v. Evnen, 948 N.W.2d 244 (Neb. 2020).
66. Thom v. Barnett, 967 N.W.2d 261 (S.D. 2021).
67. In re Initiative Measure No. 65: Butler v. Watson, NO. 2020-IA-01199-SCT, 2021
WL 1940821 (Miss. 2021).
68. The Author consulted with the campaigns in all three of these states. Views
expressed here are her own.
69. Idaho, Kansas, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Wyoming have not adopted
state-level medical marijuana laws. See Map of Marijuana Illegality by State, DISA,
https://disa.com/map-of-marijuana-legality-by-state [https://perma.cc/Z2U8-R7AV] (last
visited Feb. 4, 2022).
70. See NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28–416 (West 2022). Despite decriminalizing
possession in 1979, Nebraska arrested almost 8,000 people in 2018 for marijuana possession
making up almost half of all drug arrests in the state. See ACLU, A TALE OF TWO
COUNTRIES: RACIALLY TARGETED ARRESTS IN THE ERA OF MARIJUANA REFORM 74 (2020),
https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/marijuanareport_03232021.pdf
[https://perma.cc/HK56-WL26]. Black people are arrested at 3.1 times the rate of white
people for marijuana possession in Nebraska. See id.
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since, and some elected officials have demonstrated outright hostility to
neighboring states’ reforms.71
Nebraska voters and their elected officials disagree on the issue of
marijuana, particularly medical marijuana. Seventy-seven percent of
Nebraska voters favor legalizing medical marijuana for patients with
serious or debilitating medical conditions,72 with vocal patients in the state
advocating passionately for legislative reform.73 However, in recent years,
medical marijuana bills introduced in Nebraska have faced strong
opposition from lawmakers and failed to advance through the Legislature.74
Reform efforts have also been met with strong and vocal opposition
from Nebraska Governor Pete Ricketts, who has aggressively fought
against efforts to legalize medical marijuana under Nebraska law.75 In
response to a bill being considered by the state Legislature to allow medical
marijuana, Governor Ricketts told reporters: “This is a dangerous drug that
will impact our kids . . . . If you legalize marijuana, you’re gonna kill your
kids. That’s what the data shows from around the country.”76 Governor
Ricketts argued that the medical marijuana legislation introduced in

71. In 2014, Nebraska joined Oklahoma to file an original action in the U.S. Supreme
Court to strike down Amendment 64, Colorado’s voter enacted amendment to legalize
marijuana, claiming that Colorado’s removal of state marijuana penalties was preempted by
federal law and would lead to marijuana being brought into Nebraska to the detriment of the
state. See Nebraska v. Colorado, 577 U.S. 1211 (2016). The Supreme Court ultimately
declined to hear the case. See id.
72. See Max Savage Levenson, Election 2020: Nebraska Medical Marijuana
Legalization Guide, LEAFLY (July 29, 2020), https://www.leafly.com/news/politics/election2020-nebraska-medical-marijuana-legalization-guide [https://perma.cc/7LMS-KP5E].
73. See Jael Pembrick, Crowd Gathers at State Capitol in Support of Legalizing Medical
Marijuana, NEB. NEWS (July 2, 2020, 6:59 PM), https://www.klkntv.com/crowd-gathers-atstate-capitol-in-support-of-legalizing-medical-marijuana/ [https://perma.cc/2JJX-MKHJ].
74. LB 643, the “Cannabis Compassionate and Care Act,” would have would have
allowed patients with conditions such as Crohn’s disease, epilepsy, opioid addictions, and
some types of cancer to obtain marijuana in pill, oil, or liquid form. See Anna Gronewold,
Medical Marijuana Bill Fails in Nebraska, ARGUS LEADER (Apr. 6, 2016, 6:43 AM),
https://www.argusleader.com/story/news/politics/2016/04/06/medical-marijuana-bill-failsnebraska/82693392/ [https://perma.cc/5FTJ-PVSJ]. It was defeated in 2016 after failing to
overcome a filibuster. See id. In 2021, Senator Anna Wishart introduced LB 474 to establish
a medical cannabis program through the Nebraska Unicameral Legislature. See Kyle Jaeger,
Nebraska Medical Marijuana Legalization Bill Stalls in Legislature amid Filibuster,
MARIJUANA MOMENT (May 12, 2021), https://www.marijuanamoment.net/nebraskamedical-marijuana-legalization-bill-stalls-in-legislature-amid-filibuster/
[https://perma.cc/H4TE-6Q8S]. Despite a strong public push from medical cannabis
patients, their families, and other allies, the bill failed to overcome a filibuster. See id.
75. See William Cummings, Nebraska Gov. Ricketts Warns: ‘If You Legalize
Marijuana, You’re Going to Kill Your Kids,’ USA TODAY (Mar. 13, 2021, 4:53 PM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2021/03/12/nebraska-gov-pete-ricketts-legalmarijuana-kill-your-kids/4663466001/ [https://perma.cc/FL6Z-LG3D].
76. See id.
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Nebraska is a “dangerous” effort to go around the normal process of federal
approval for medical drugs.77 His official website states that legalizing
medical marijuana “puts the well-being of Nebraskans at risk.”78
The Nebraska Attorney General also strongly opposes medical
marijuana stating: “Some say medical marijuana, I almost don’t even
accept that title because I understand this comes from an industry that
really has no medical concern.”79 In 2019, he issued a flawed analysis that
one of the medical marijuana bills in the state Legislature, the Medical
Cannabis Act, would be preempted by the federal Controlled Substances
Act.80 Thirty-four other states have enacted laws similar to the Medical
Cannabis Act pursuant to their Tenth Amendment powers, consistent with
clear precedent from the U.S. Supreme Court,81 and largely without any
preemption issue.82 The Attorney General’s legal analysis is so dubious
that its intent seems likely aimed at undermining support for the bill rather
than providing an accurate, impartial assessment of the actual legal risks.

77. See id.
78. See Marijuana Is a Dangerous Drug, OFF. GOVERNOR PETE RICKETTS,
https://governor.nebraska.gov/press/marijuana-dangerous-drug?autoplay=1
[https://perma.cc/LHF5-49CT] (last visited Jan. 15 2022). Additional comments on
marijuana by Ricketts include: “States that legalize marijuana outright or incrementally (that
is, through ‘medical marijuana’) have seen a human toll. This has included devastating
effects on kids, tragic accidents, decreased participation in the workforce, and horrible
mental health outcomes” and “[t]he multi-billion dollar marijuana industry will continue to
say anything to get the drug legalized and avoid regulation for public safety. I urge
Nebraskans to be steadfast in resisting their tactics.” Governor Pete Ricketts, Marijuana: A
Clear and Present Danger, OFF. GOVERNOR PETE RICKETTS (Feb. 23, 2021), https://gover
nor.nebraska.gov/press/marijuana-clear-and-present-danger [https://perma.cc/SQ3D-UEA8].
79. See Lauren Kummer, Special Report: Medical Marijuana in Nebraska, ADAM
MORFIELD CNTY. ATT’Y, https://adammorfeld.com/uncategorized/special-report-medicalmarijuana-in-nebraska/ [https://perma.cc/EGZ5-4248] (last visited Feb. 2, 2022).
80. See Robert Mikos, Nebraska Attorney General Gives the State Some Bad Legal
Advice Concerning Marijuana Legalization, VAND. MARIJUANA L., POL’Y, & AUTH. (Aug. 4,
2019),
https://my.vanderbilt.edu/marijuanalaw/2019/08/nebraska-attorney-general-givesthe-state-some-bad-legal-advice-concerning-marijuana-legalization/
[https://perma.cc/U8E4-C6NA] (“[I]t should be pretty apparent by now that Congress has no
power to preempt states from legalizing / authorizing marijuana possession and supply
under state law. Simply put, the anti-commandeering rule enables states to legalize /
authorize marijuana possession and sales.”).
81. See, e.g., Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461 (2018); see
also Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
82. Contra Letter from Douglas J. Peterson, Att’y Gen. of Nebraska, & David A. Lopez,
Deputy Solicitor Gen. of Nebraska, to Sen. Andrew La Grone, Nebraska Legis. (Dec. 20,
2019). Additionally, a federal budget rider specifically prevents federal action against these
state laws. See United States v. McIntosh, 833 F.3d 1163, 1168, 1175–77 (9th Cir. 2016)
(interpreting the rider to prevent expenditures on the prosecution of individuals who comply
with state law).
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To put it simply, the voters in Nebraska strongly support a policy reform
that the majority of elected officials, including those with the most power,
strongly oppose. Thus, like in many other states on the issue of marijuana,
voters’ only option for meaningful reform is to turn to the ballot initiative
process to bypass intransigent elected lawmakers.
Nebraska has a long history of direct democracy. The initiative and
referendum process in Nebraska was first established in 1912 through an
amendment to the state constitution,83 which declared: “The people reserve
for themselves the power to propose laws and amendments to the
Constitution and to enact or reject the same at the polls, independent of the
Legislature, which power shall be called the power of initiative.”84 While
not as commonly used as in some other states, Nebraska citizens have
regularly exercised their legislative power to enact laws to address a range
of issues, including soldiers’ pay, legalizing bingo, property taxes, gun
rights, and perhaps most famously, to establish a unicameral legislature that
is unique to Nebraska.85
The process in Nebraska is similar to that in many of the initiative states.
Nebraskans may initiate legislation as either a state statute or as an
amendment to the state constitution86 and may repeal statutes adopted by
the Legislature via veto referendum.87 Additionally, the Legislature can
legislatively refer, with a three-fifths majority vote, proposed constitutional
amendments on the ballot for voters to adopt or reject.88
For citizens to qualify an initiative for the ballot, there are a number of
procedural requirements that must be met: (1) the signatures must be
collected from a certain percentage of registered voters in the state — 10%
for a constitutional amendment and 7% for a statutory measure; (2) they
must be collected within a certain timeframe; and (3) they must meet
distribution requirements among Nebraska’s 93 counties.89 Moreover,

83. See ROBERT B. EVNEN, SEC’Y OF STATE, STATE OF NEB., HOW TO USE THE INITIATIVE
REFERENDUM PROCESS IN NEBRASKA (2019), https://sos.nebraska.gov/sites/sos.
nebraska.gov/files/doc/elections/2018/state-initiative-and-referendum-packet.pdf
[https://perma.cc/HG9K-DPXL]. Many of the initial initiative supporters were alcohol
prohibitionists trying to reduce the influence of liquor interests in politics. See Nebraska,
INITIATIVE & REFERENDUM INST., http://www.iandrinstitute.org/states/state.cfm?id=17
[https://perma.cc/426Y-Y9RA] (last visited Feb. 2, 2022).
84. NEB. CONST. art. III, § 1.
85. See Nebraska Initiatives (1912–2000), INITIATIVE & REFERENDUM INST.,
http://www.iandrinstitute.org/docs/Nebraska.pdf [https://perma.cc/9GNL-ZPS6]; see also
INITIATIVE & REFERENDUM INST., supra note 16.
86. See NEB. CONST. art. III, § 2.
87. See id. art. III, § 3.
88. See id. art. XVI, § 1.
89. See id. art. III, §§ 2–3.
AND
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there are specific requirements as to what form the petition must take.90
There are also substantive restrictions, including (1) that a ballot measure
may not limit the Legislature’s ability to enact taxes91 and (2) that each
proposed measure must embrace only one subject, otherwise known as a
“single-subject rule.”92
In 2019, frustrated by the failure to enact medical marijuana protections
in Nebraska legislatively, two state lawmakers, Adam Morfeld and Anna
Wishart, formed Nebraskans for Medical Marijuana. The express goal of
this organization was to qualify an initiative for the ballot so that voters
could directly reform marijuana laws.93 Their petition to place the
Nebraska Medical Cannabis Constitutional Amendment was filed with the
Secretary of State for circulation and in June of 2020, they submitted over
182,000 signatures to the Secretary of State.94 On August 27, 2020, the
Secretary of State verified that the petition had enough valid signatures to
qualify for the ballot.95
A day prior to the last day for certification for the ballot, a law firm
representing several unnamed Nebraska residents lodged an objection to
the initiative’s certification with the Secretary of State on the basis that the
proposed initiative would violate Nebraska’s single-subject rule and was
legally insufficient.96 The Secretary of State reviewed and rejected the
challenge, and subsequently certified the initiative.97 In Wagner v. Evnen,

90. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 32-1405 (2021) (requiring petition must be filed with a
statement as to the object of the petition and the text of the measure must be filed together
with a sworn statement containing the names and address of the sponsors of the petition).
91. NEB. CONST. art. III, § 2 (“The constitutional limitations as to the scope and subject
matter of statutes enacted by the Legislature shall apply to those enacted by the initiative.”).
92. See id. (“Initiative measures shall contain only one subject.”).
93. See NEBRASKANS FOR MEDICAL MARIJUANA, https://www.nebraskamarijuana.org
[https://perma.cc/3WMP-72LG] (last visited Feb. 2, 2022).
94. See Brief of Intervenors at 8, State ex rel. Wagner v. Evnen, 948 N.W.2d 244 (Neb.
2020) (“On July 2, 2020, more than four months prior to the November 3, 2020, general
election, the Sponsors properly submitted over 182,000 sufficient and valid signatures of
registered Nebraska voters to Respondent for placement of the Medical Marijuana Initiative
on the November 3, 2020, general election ballot.”); see also Tom Angell, Nebraska
Medical Marijuana Campaign Submits 182,000 Signatures to Qualify for Ballot,
MARIJUANA MOMENT (July 2, 2020), https://www.marijuanamoment.net/nebraska-medicalmarijuana-campaign-submits-182000-signatures-to-qualify-for-ballot/
[https://perma.cc/G5AX-X9DT].
95. See generally Letter from Robert B. Evnen, Sec’y of State, Nebraska, to Mark
Fahleson, Jason Grams & Max Kelch (Aug. 27, 2020) [hereinafter Evnen Letter] (on file
with author).
96. See Letter from Mark A. Fahleson, Rembolt Ludtke, to Robert B. Evnen, Sec’y of
State, Nebraska (Aug. 26, 2020) (on file with author).
97. See Evnen Letter, supra note 95, at 7 (“I conclude that the Amendment is legally
sufficient and I shall not withhold it from the ballot unless otherwise ordered by a court of
competent jurisdiction.”).
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the Lancaster County Sheriff then challenged the certification in the
Nebraska Supreme Court raising the same single-subject claim, asking that
the court remove the initiative from the ballot.98
Single-subject rules are not an unusual requirement for legislation.
Forty-three state constitutions require each piece of legislation be limited to
a single subject.99 But how the rule is interpreted and applied is
inconsistent and varies across and within jurisdictions.100 The main
purpose of the single-subject rule is generally agreed to be twofold: to limit
(1) “logrolling,” meaning the combining of two separate measures, each of
which has minority support in order to garner majority support for the
whole, and (2) “riders,” meaning adding a provision that does not have
enough support on its own to a popular measure so that the popular
measure carries the rider along.101
Nebraska’s single-subject rule was adopted by the voters via ballot
initiative in 1998102 and only applied by the Nebraska Supreme Court to a
voter ballot initiative once before in Christensen v. Gale.103 In that case,
the court adopted and applied the “natural and necessary connection test”
for determining whether an initiative violates the single subject rule.104
This test looks to whether “a proposed law, having natural and necessary
connection with each other, and together, are a part of one general subject,
the proposal is a single and not a dual proposition.”105 In making this
determination, the court looks to the proposed amendment’s “singleness of
purpose and the relationship of the details to the general subject. The
general subject is its primary purpose.”106 In Christensen, the court upheld
the Medical Assistance Act,107 a proposed initiative to (1) expand Medicaid
coverage to certain low-income adults in Nebraska and (2) direct the
Nebraska Department of Health and Human Services to take actions
necessary to maximize federal funding for medical assistance in the state.
The court found that while maximizing federal funding was a secondary
purpose, it had a natural and necessary connection to the expansion of

98. See State ex rel. Wagner v. Evnen, 948 N.W.2d 244 (Neb. 2020).
99. See Richard Briffault, The Single-Subject Rule: A State Constitutional Dilemma, 82
ALB. L. Rev. 1629, 1633 (2019).
100. See id. at 1631 (“Even with the uptick in findings of violations in recent decades, the
meaning of the rule remains murky, with the case law consisting of a mix of unpredictable ‘I
know it when I see it’ decisions.” (internal citations omitted)).
101. See id. at 1634.
102. See Legis. Res. 32, 95th Leg., 1st Sess. (Neb. 1997).
103. See 917 N.W.2d 145 (Neb. 2018).
104. Id. at 156.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 68–901 to 68–991 (2017).
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Medicaid because it would better enable the state to pay for the
coverage.108
The primary purpose of the Nebraskans for Sensible Marijuana Laws’
proposed amendment was fairly straightforward — to legalize medical
marijuana in Nebraska for persons with serious medical conditions. The
language contained nine subsections related to this purpose: (1) allowing
adult patients to use, possess, access, purchase, and produce marijuana if
recommended by the physician; (2) allowing minor patients to do the same
with permission from a parent or guardian; (3) allowing private entities to
produce and provide marijuana to patients allowed to use under (1) and (2);
(4) decriminalizing the allowed marijuana-related activities under state law;
and (5) allowing the Legislature to enact health and safety regulations
related to medical marijuana. Subsections (6)–(8) set forth a number of
limitations on medical cannabis use. Subsection (9) simply defined
“cannabis.”109 The proposed measure was significantly simpler than many
measures enacted previously by ballot initiatives in other states, many of
which establish complex state regulatory programs as well as create patient
registry and identification card programs, advisory boards, and tax and
revenue streams.
The Nebraska Supreme Court disagreed. The court struck the entire
initiative from the ballot. Even though sufficient signatures were collected
and polling showed strong support for medical marijuana,110 Nebraskans
were not permitted to vote on the initiative.
What was the court’s reasoning? The court found that the Nebraska
Medical Cannabis Constitutional Amendment (NMCCA) contained
multiple different subjects — in violation of the single subject rule — and
removed it from the ballot.111 The court found that the initiative’s general
subject was to create a constitutional right for patients with serious medical
conditions to produce and use cannabis subject to a recommendation by a
physician, and that subsections (1) and (2) (allowing adult and minor
patients to engage in these activities), subsection (5) (allowing the
Legislature to regulate), and subsection (9) (defining cannabis) evidenced
this purpose.
However, the court then found that subsections (3) (allowing private
entities to produce and provide cannabis to patients) and (4)
(decriminalizing the allowed conduct under state and local law) furthered a

108. See Christensen, 917 N.W.2d at 156.
109. See ADAM MORFELD, ANNA WISHART & NEBRASKANS FOR SENSIBLE MARIJUANA L.,
NEBRASKA MEDICAL CANNABIS CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (2019).
110. See Levenson, supra note 72.
111. State ex. rel. Wagner v. Evnen, 948 N.W.2d 244, 260 (Neb. 2020).
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different purpose by providing the right to grow and sell and immunizing
these activities. The court reasoned that subsections (1) and (2) were about
individual rights and subsection (3) was about property rights and thus
beyond the single purpose. And since subsection (1) allowed patients to
produce marijuana, a patient’s ability to access marijuana would not
depend entirely on entities also being allowed to produce marijuana, and
thus, subsection (3) was not necessarily connected to subsections (1) and
(2).112
The court’s reasoning is strained. A more logical and natural reading of
the purpose of the proposed measure was to allow patients to use medical
cannabis when recommended by the physician. The right to use was
established through subsections (1) and (2). However, the right to use is
meaningless without a mechanism for the marijuana to be produced and
obtained by the patients. The source of marijuana was established through
subsection (1) allowing patients to grow and subsection (3) allowing
private entities to grow and provide to patients. There is simply no logic to
the idea that the single-subject requirement mandates that the initiative
limits patients to a single source of marijuana. While some patients can
grow their own, other patients are elderly, incapacitated, lack an area to
garden or a green thumb, and need to purchase their marijuana. However,
both methods clearly fall together under an initiative with the purpose of
providing patients access to medical marijuana. Without subsection (3),
allowing private entities to produce and provide marijuana to patients, the
right established in subsection (1), allowing adult patients to use, possess,
access, purchase, and produce marijuana if recommended by a physician,
becomes meaningless to many patients. There are few voters who would
support the right of a patient to use medical marijuana but would oppose
that patient’s ability to obtain marijuana for use, undermining any serious
claim of logrolling. This more reasoned approach is how the court
analyzed the Medicaid initiative, where it found that the expansion of
Medicaid was clearly connected to its funding source as both were intended
to expand access to Medicaid.113 Additionally, it is also necessary for the
activities in subsections (1) and (2) to have meaning for those engaging in
the activities to be protected from arrest under subsection (4). If the
allowed conduct is not decriminalized, then the purpose of the initiative is
thwarted.
The court then went on to find the NMCCA had six additional purposes.
Subsection (6) restricted medical marijuana use in public, in a correctional
facility, while driving, or negligently, while subsection (7) restricted

112. See id. at 257.
113. See Christensen, 917 N.W.2d at 152–53.
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medical marijuana use at work, and subsection (8) clarified that insurance
was not required to cover medical marijuana. Together these subsections
comprised a set of limitations to what the initiative was otherwise allowing.
They simply narrow the rights being created. The court found that each of
these limitations created a new subject by delving into additional areas of
the law governing public spaces, employment, and insurance law.114 The
court found that since a voter might want to approve or disapprove a right
to use marijuana, but not want to approve or disprove the use of marijuana
in a public space or while driving, this constituted impermissible logrolling:
“On its face, the NMCAA indicates that these subjects of constitutional
amendment were included for tactical convenience, not any natural and
necessary connection. This is . . . an example of logrolling.”115
The court’s holding seems to create a new rule that limits initiatives to a
single provision rather than to a single subject and that prohibits the
inclusion of elements that are considered “tactical” based on their
popularity with voters regardless of their relatedness to the purpose and
subject of the initiative. Put simply, the court’s holding is that the single
subject rule prohibits the voters from placing an initiative in the ballot that
would allow patients to use medical marijuana, except for in public. The
court considers the use of medical marijuana and the use of medical
marijuana in public to be two separate subjects that must be presented as
two separate initiatives to the voters.116 Because a restriction on marijuana
use in public is a responsible public health provision making it likely
popular with voters, the court views its inclusion “tactical” and is thus not
allowed.117 Through its extreme narrowing of what constitutes a single
subject, the court, in effect, removed the option for voters to enact an
initiative to allow for medical marijuana with responsible guardrails, such
as restrictions on public use and driving.
The court’s decertification of the NMCAA significantly limits Nebraska
citizens’ right to the initiative as it creates a new rule that is so narrow as to
be nearly impossible to follow. However, on the same day the court issued
its decision removing the NMCAA from the ballot, it found that a trio of
initiatives expanding gambling in Nebraska satisfied the single-subject rule,
despite the initiatives containing multiple provisions touching numerous
areas of substantive law, including taxing gambling to fund property tax

114. See Wagner, 948 N.W.2d at 259.
115. Id.
116. See id.
117. The dissent points out that the majority analysis would prevent citizens in a
municipality that has previously banned dog ownership from proposing an initiative to allow
for dog ownership with the exception of pit bulls. See id. at 170 (Papik, J., dissenting).
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relief, as well as restrictions that limited activities otherwise allowed.118 In
this decision, the court did not follow the logic it has just employed in
Wagner that led it to conclude the restricting public use of medical
marijuana was a different subject than legalizing medical marijuana. Here,
this court held just the opposite: “Identifying and limiting the location of a
new activity is a detail naturally and necessarily connected to its creation
and not a separate subject” and that “logrolling has no application when
propositions are related.”119 The court did not explain why these same
principles do not apply to allowing the use of medical marijuana but not in
public. This decision indicates that the court may be creating a special
single-subject rule for marijuana-related initiatives that it will choose to not
apply more broadly, or at least less stringently, to less disfavored subjects.
B. Case Study: South Dakota
Like Nebraska, South Dakota is one of the few states, prior to the 2020
election, that lacked any meaningful marijuana law reform. The state also
has a strong history of aggressive enforcement against minor marijuana
offenses. Unlike Nebraska however, South Dakota did not decriminalize
possession of marijuana in the 1970s; it still remains a criminal offense.120
Additionally, South Dakota was the only state that outlawed ingestion of a
controlled substance where testing positive for marijuana on a drug screen
can be a misdemeanor offense.121
Between 2009 to 2018, 31,883 people were arrested for marijuana in
South Dakota; 95% of them were for possession offenses.122 In 2018,
roughly one out of every ten arrests in South Dakota were for marijuana.123
Moreover, the vast majority of marijuana arrests involved less than seven
grams of the drug, and over 40% of all such arrests involved just one gram
or less and not indicative of other criminal activity: 98.2% of marijuana
violations in South Dakota from 2007 to 2016 were standalone offenses,

118. See State ex rel. McNalley v. Evnen, 948 N.W.2d 463 (2020).
119. Id. at 479–80.
120. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-42-6 (2021) (“It is a Class 1 misdemeanor to possess two
ounces of marijuana or less.”).
121. See id. § 22-42-5.1; see also Lee Strubinger, Former AG Urges State Lawmakers to
Keep Ingestion on the Books, S.D. PUB. RADIO (Oct. 10, 2019, 1:59 PM), https://listen
.sdpb.org/politics/2019-10-10/former-ag-urges-state-lawmakers-to-keep-ingestion-on-thebooks [https://perma.cc/EF65-8Y8A].
122. See JON B. GETTMAN, MARIJUANA ARRESTS IN SOUTH DAKOTA 3 (2018),
https://www.southdakotamarijuana.org/arrest-report
[https://perma.cc/ER6T-TB8N]
(compiling data from the U.S. Department of Justice’s Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR)
Program).
123. See id. at 16.

2022]

TAKING THE INITIATIVE

579

meaning the individual was not charged with any other crime.124 In 2018,
South Dakota had the highest total arrest rate of any state, increasing
176.1% since 2010.125 In 2018, Black people were five times more likely
than white people to be arrested for marijuana possession.126
Until 2020, South Dakotans lacked any meaningful access to medical
marijuana due to inaction by the Legislature127 and failed ballot initiative
attempts in both 2006128 and 2010.129 Despite the failed earlier ballot
measures, a majority of voters now support medical marijuana and
legalization for adult use.130 Still, elected officials generally remain
strongly opposed, led most prominently by Governor Kristi Noem who
promised during her 2018 gubernatorial campaign to “oppose all attempts
to legalize marijuana.”131 Governor Noem even vetoed a bill legalizing
industrial hemp sent to her by the Legislature and penned an opinion piece
in The Wall Street Journal on why she opposed the legalization of hemp,132
making South Dakota only one of three states not to legalize hemp as
allowed under the federal farm bill.133

124. See id. at 4.
125. See ACLU, supra note 70.
126. See id. at 88.
127. See H.R. Res. 1127, 84th Sess., Leg. Assemb. (S.D. 2009); see also H.R. Res 1128,
84th Sess., Leg. Assemb. (S.D. 2009).
128. See South Dakota Medical Marijuana, Initiative 4 (2006), BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/South_Dakota_Medical_Marijuana,Initiative_4_%282006%29
[https://perma.cc/ZGT5-9PT5] (last visited Jan. 31, 2022).
129. See South Dakota Medical Marijuana, Initiative 13 (2010), BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/South_Dakota_Medical_Marijuana,_Initiative_13_%282010%29
[https://perma.cc/D4LQ-7REL] (last visited Jan. 31, 2022).
130. See Joe Sneve, Poll: Most South Dakota Voters Support Legalizing Marijuana,
ARGUS
LEADER
(Sept.
18,
2020,
4:27
PM),
https://www.argusleader.
com/story/news/2020/09/18/poll-most-south-dakota-voters-support-legalizingmarijuana/5828238002/ [https://perma.cc/PRD8-SP4F] (reporting on a poll from Public
Opinion Strategies finding that 60% of respondents support full legalization and 70%
support medical use legalization).
131. See Jacob Sullum, 9 Governors Get ‘A’ Grades for Marijuana Reform, up from 2
Last Year, REASON (Jan. 24, 2019, 1:05 PM), https://reason.com/2019/01/24/9-governorsget-a-grades-for-marijuana-r/ [https://perma.cc/QLX4-A4BJ].
132. See Kristi Noem, Opinion, Why I Won’t Support Legalizing Hemp, WALL ST. J.
(Sept. 9, 2019, 6:38 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/why-i-wont-support-legalizinghemp-11568068697 [https://perma.cc/GJ3X-HHFZ].
133. See generally Agriculture Improvement Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-334, 132 Stat.
4490. The other states are Idaho and New Hampshire. See Vishal Vivek, A List of Legal
Hemp States in the USA, HEMP FOUND. (Feb. 7, 2020), https://hempfoundation.net/a-list-oflegal-hemp-states-in-the-usa/#12_Idaho [https://perma.cc/4MTY-2ULV]; see also Theresa
Bennett, Hemp’s Wild Ride in South Dakota Ends with Legalization, HEMP GROWER (Aug.
6, 2020), https://www.hempgrower.com/article/hemp-south-dakota-legalization/ [https://
perma.cc/4442-R85W].
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Like Nebraska, South Dakota has a long history with direct democracy.
Father Robert Haire, a Catholic priest, was one of the originators of the
initiative and referendum process, advocating for the adoption of direct
democracy in South Dakota as early as the 1880s.134 In 1898, the initiative
and referendum were on the ballot and passed by a wide margin, making
South Dakota the first state to adopt such a process allowing the voters to
directly enact laws.135 South Dakotans continue to be highly supportive of
the citizen-led ballot initiative process as a way to make laws or change the
state constitution.136
With strong voter support in the face of lawmaker intransigence, two
ballot campaigns placed both a medical-marijuana-initiated statute and a
full legalization initiated constitutional amendment on the November 2020
ballot.137 Both initiatives won handily on election day.138 Initiative
Measure 26 — to allow patients to use medical marijuana with a
recommendation from their physician through the creation of a medical
marijuana program — was enacted by 70% of the voters.139 Furthermore,
Constitutional Amendment A — to amend the South Dakota Constitution
to remove penalties for the personal use of marijuana by adults who are 21
and older and allow the commercial production and distribution of
marijuana — was enacted by the voters with 54% support.140
134. See Katie Hunhoff, Credit or Blame the Aberdeen Priest, S.D. MAG. (Feb. 21,
2017), https://www.southdakotamagazine.com/aberdeens-populist-priest [https://perma.cc/
PYK7-RBT8]; see also Patrick Gallagher, Father Robert Haire: Humanity’s Friend,
ABERDEEN MAG. (Dec. 2018), https://aberdeenmag.com/2019/01/father-haire/ [https:
//perma.cc/U3RP-S44S].
135. See History & Past South Dakota Ballot Questions, S.D. SEC’Y ST., https://sdsos
.gov/elections-voting/upcoming-elections/ballot-question-information/general-ballotquestion-information.aspx [https://perma.cc/D22W-CGM6] (last visited Feb. 3, 2022).
136. See Bart Pfankuch, Poll Part 3: South Dakotans Support Ballot Initiative Process
and Oppose Lawmaker Interference, MITCHELL REPUBLIC (May 27, 2021, 1:45 PM),
https://www.mitchellrepublic.com/news/poll-part-3-south-dakotans-support-ballotinitiative-process-and-oppose-lawmaker-interference [https://perma.cc/3LPV-RSG8].
137. See 2020 Ballot Questions, S.D. SEC’Y ST., https://sdsos.gov/electionsvoting/upcoming-elections/general-information/2020-ballot-questions.aspx
[https://perma.cc/3YUC-8E2D] (last visited Feb. 3, 2022).
138. See South Dakota Official Election Returns and Registration Figures, S.D. SEC’Y
ST., https://sdsos.gov/elections-voting/assets/ElectionReturns2020web.pdf [https://perma.cc
/BS92-5N6H] (last visited Feb. 3, 2022) (results of the 2020 General Election show that
Amendment A won with 54% of the vote and Initiated Measure 26 won with 70% of the
vote).
139. See South Dakota Initiative Measure 26, Medical Marijuana Initiative (2020),
BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/South_Dakota_Initiated_Measure_26,_Medical_Mari
juana_Initiative_(2020) [https://perma.cc/5DA7-BKYK] (last visited Feb. 3, 2022).
140. See South Dakota Constitutional Amendment A, Marijuana Legalization Initiative
(2020), BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/South_Dakota_Constitutional_Amendment_
A,_Marijuana_Legalization_Initiative_(2020) [https://perma.cc/5298-FLJE] (last visited
Feb. 3, 2022).
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The proponent of Amendment A was Brendan Johnson, the former U.S.
Attorney for South Dakota under the Obama Administration. The
opposition was led by Governor Noem, who chose to focus on Amendment
A rather than the very popular Measure 26. She starred in an opposition ad
stating: “The fact is, I’ve never met someone who got smarter from
smoking pot . . . . It’s not good for our kids. And it’s not going to improve
our communities . . . As your governor, I’m urging all South Dakotans to
vote no on legalizing marijuana this November.”141
Amendment A142 made lawful the possession, use, and cultivation of
limited personal use quantities of marijuana; directed the department of
revenue to license and regulate the production, testing, and sale of
marijuana; and enacted a marijuana-specific tax to go to schools and the
general fund. Additionally, it required the Legislature to legalize medical
marijuana and hemp.143 It was remarkably similar to successful voterinitiated amendments to legalize marijuana that were successfully adopted
and implemented in numerous other states.144

141. See Kyle Jaeger, South Dakota Governor Urges ‘No’ Vote on Marijuana
Legalization Initiative in New Ad, MARIJUANA MOMENT (Oct. 23, 2020),
https://www.marijuanamoment.net/south-dakota-governor-urges-no-vote-on-marijuanalegalization-initiative-in-new-ad/ [https://perma.cc/8NZN-XT9R].
142. The text of Amendment A can be found at the South Dakota Secretary of State 2020
Ballot Questions webpage. See 2020 Ballot Questions, supra note 137.
143. See id.
144. See Colorado Marijuana Legalization Initiative, Amendment 64 (2012),
BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Colorado_Marijuana_Legalization_Initiative,_Amend
ment_64_(2012) [https://perma.cc/X3Y4-JZQE] (last visited Feb. 3, 2022); see also N.J.
DIV. ELECTIONS, N.J. DEP’T OF STATE, OFFICIAL LIST PUBLIC QUESTION RESULTS FOR
11/03/2020 –
GENERAL
ELECTION:
PUBLIC
QUESTION
NO. 1
(2020),
https://nj.gov/state/elections/assets/pdf/election-results/2020/2020-official-general-resultspublic-question-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/J7KC-ZX2K]. For voter enacted constitutional
amendments to legalize medical marijuana that were similar to Amendment A in complexity
and substance, see Arkansas Medical Marijuana Amendment, Issue 6 (2016), BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/Arkansas_Medical_Marijuana_Amendment,_Issue_6_(2016)
[https://perma.cc/RW2D-S8YG] (last visited Feb. 3, 2022) (the ballot initiative was
approved by 53% of state voters in 2016). See also Colorado Medical Use of Marijuana,
Initiative 20 (2000), BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Colorado_Medical_Use_of_Marij
uana,_Initiative_20_(2000) [https://perma.cc/4QFE-TPM3] (last visited Feb. 3, 2022) (the
initiative passed with 54 percent of the vote in 2000); Florida Medical Marijuana
Legalization, Amendment 2 (2016), BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Florida_
Medical_Marijuana_Legalization,_Amendment_2_(2016) [https://perma.cc/7CWQ-Q69B]
(last visited Feb. 3, 2022) (approved by 71% of the electorate in 2016); Missouri
Amendment 2, Medical Marijuana and Veteran Healthcare Services Initiative (2018),
BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Missouri_Amendment_2,_Medical_Marijuana_and_
Veteran_Healthcare_Services_Initiative_(2018) [https://perma.cc/L4PZ-6JRL] (last visited
Feb. 3, 2022) (enacted with 66% of the popular vote in 2018); Mississippi Ballot Measure 1,
Initiative 65 and Alternative 65A, Medical Marijuana Amendment (2020), BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/Mississippi_Ballot_Measure_1,_Initiative_65_and_Alternative_65A,
_Medical_Marijuana_Amendment_(2020) [https://perma.cc/D95N-KWQR] (last visited
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Immediately following the election, Pennington County Sheriff Kevin
Thom and Superintendent of the South Dakota Highway Patrol Colonel
Rick Miller, both of whom had publicly opposed the measure and
campaigned against it, filed two complaints in South Dakota Circuit Court
seeking to repeal the Amendment A.145 Governor Noem then issued an
executive order directing that the plaintiff bring the litigation on her
behalf.146
In the complaints, both Sheriff Thom and Superintendent Miller argued
that the amendment does not adhere to the South Dakota Constitution.147
They brought one challenge as an election contest even though they did not
allege any evidence of irregularities in the voting or counting of votes. The
circuit court dismissed this challenge.148 The second challenge was a
substantive claim that argued that Amendment A violated South Dakota’s
single-subject requirement and that it involved such a drastic rewriting of
the South Dakota Constitution so as to require a constitutional convention
rather than a simple initiative petition.149
South Dakota’s single-subject rule is a recent addition to the South
Dakota Constitution, added via ballot initiative in 2018 to require that both
initiated constitutional amendments and legislatively referred constitutional
amendments concern only one single subject.150 The Legislature placed it
on the ballot as part of its effort to reform and restrict access to the ballot

Feb. 3, 2022) (Mississippians passed the Initiative in 2020); Nevada Medical Marijuana
Act, Question 9 (1998), BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Nevada_Medical_Marijuana_
Act,_Question_9_(1998) [https://perma.cc/MH2V-49QC] (last visited Feb. 3, 2022) (first
endorsed by 59% of voters in 1998).
145. See Brief for Appellants South Dakotans for Better Marijuana Laws, Randolf Seiler,
William Stocker, Charles Parkinson, and Melissa Mentelem, Thom v. Barnett, 967 N.W.2d
261 (S.D. 2021) (Appeal No. 29546).
146. S.D. Exec. Order No. 2021-02 (2021), https://sdsos.gov/general-information/
executive-actions/executive-orders/assets/2021-02%20-%20.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3XB8L2AJ].
147. See Brief for Appellants, supra note 145.
148. Sixth Circuit Judge Klinger rejected this challenge: “Contestants have not alleged
any irregularities during the 2020 General Election, much less shown anything suggesting
the will of the voters was suppressed. As a result, the issues alleged are not appropriately
resolved in an election contest cause of action.” In re Election Contest as to Amendment A,
No. 32CIV20-186 (S.D. Cir. Ct. Feb. 8, 2021).
149. See Brief for Appellants, supra note 145 (claiming that Amendment A “proposed a
drastic revision to the Constitution that could not be proposed by initiative under Article
XXIII because it addressed multiple subjects and purported to add an entirely new article to
the Constitution”).
150. See South Dakota Constitutional Amendment Z, Single-Subject Rule for
Constitutional Amendments (2018), BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/South_
Dakota_Constitutional_Amendment_Z,_Single-Subject_Rule_for_Constitutional
_Amendments_(2018) [https://perma.cc/X7VF-YR4T] (last visited Jan. 18, 2022).
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after nine initiatives appeared on the 2016 ballot.151 Speaker of the House
Mark Mickelson was not coy about his intent in sponsoring changes
claiming that the initiative process was “being cluttered and crowded out
by folks that don’t live here . . . . So now, we get used as a testing ground
because we’ve got cheap media markets and low ballot signature
requirements to get on.”152
The Sixth Circuit Court invalidated Amendment A, enacted by the
voters only months earlier, on both grounds.153 The court found that
marijuana and hemp, although both cannabis plants, were different subjects
and that enacting civil penalties, restricting penalties for various marijuanarelated activities and services, and allocating tax revenue were not
reasonably related to the overall topic of legalizing marijuana to constitute
a single subject.154 In doing so, the court tossed out the results of a validly
held election where 55% of the voters were subject to a lengthy campaign
in which they heard and flat-out rejected opponents’ policy-based
argument.
Based on plaintiffs’ argument that Amendment A contained such an
extensive rewriting of the South Dakota Constitution so to require a
constitutional convention called by three-fourths of the Legislature and a
majority vote of the people by initiative petition, the South Dakota Sixth
Circuit found that Amendment A did, in fact, cross that threshold by
removing certain authority held by the Legislature and the Governor and
shifting it to a regulatory agency.155 The decision was appealed to the
South Dakota Supreme Court.156 Five months after the voter enacted

151. House Bill 1141 established a task force to investigate the state’s initiative and veto
referendum process and suggest changes to the legislature. See 2017 Bills, S.D.
LEGISLATURE, https://www.sdlegislature.gov/Session/Bills/27 [https://perma.cc/U5HMAPHV] (last visited Jan. 18, 2022).
152. Dirk Lammers, 2018 Legislators Chip Away at Initiated Measure Process, CAP. J.
(Sept. 24, 2019), https://www.capjournal.com/news/legislators-chip-away-at-initiatedmeasure-process/article_d258a640-3308-11e8-be49-9f9bb2167c9b.html
[https://perma.cc/TLX7-JXXV].
153. See Thom v. Barnett, 967 N.W.2d 261, 266 (S.D. 2021).
154. The court also rejected the argument that the plaintiffs’ single-subject challenge was
untimely and should have been brought prior to the election and the amendment being
approved by the voters contrary to the process in several other states, such as Nebraska
discussed above. See id.
155. See Thom v. Barnett, No. 32CIV20-187 (S.D. Cir. Ct. Feb. 8, 2021) (“Several
provisions of Amendment A implement ‘far reaching changes’ in the basic nature of South
Dakota’s governmental system by taking authority given to the Legislative and Executive
branches and allocating it to the Department of Revenue.”).
156. See Thom, 967 N.W.2d.; see also WATCH: Supreme Court Arguments on
Amendment A, KELOLAND MEDIA GROUP (Apr. 28, 2021, 2:03 PM),
https://www.keloland.com/news/local-news/south-dakota-marijuana/supreme-court-
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amendment was to take effect, the Supreme Court invalidated Amendment
A based on its determination that Amendment A violated the South Dakota
Constitution.157
The court found that Amendment A embraced three separate subjects
unconnected to each other in purpose: (1) Recreational marijuana, through
the creation of a system to legalize, regulate, and tax marijuana for adults
21 years of age and older; (2) hemp, by directing the Legislature to regulate
hemp; and (3) medical marijuana, by directing the Legislature to allow
access for medical use by qualifying patients.158 The South Dakota
Supreme Court stated that the purpose of the single subject rule is to
prevent logrolling, “the ‘pernicious practice’ of combining unrelated
provisions in one amendment to ensure passage of a provision that might
otherwise fail had the provisions been submitted separately.”159 The court
expressed concern that the inclusion of the medical marijuana and hemp
provisions forced voters who favor one or both of those changes to also
approve recreational marijuana, while ignoring the long history of South
Dakota and federal law treating and criminalizing all marijuana, including
hemp, as one substance.160
Additionally, the court ignores that Amendment A appeared on the same
ballot as Measure 26, an alternative medical marijuana-only initiative
providing voters who favored medical marijuana, but opposed recreational
marijuana, an easy alternative option. That 70% of voters approved
Measure 26 and only 54% of voters approved Amendment A undercuts the
court’s suggestion of voter confusion. Voters who wanted medical
marijuana, but not recreational marijuana, voted for Measure 26. Those
who wanted both, voted for Amendment A. And in terms of hemp, the
Legislature had already adopted hemp legislation at the time of the vote on
Amendment A.161 Justice Myren points out in dissent that while the

arguments-on-amendment-a-to-livestream-on-keloland-com/
[https://perma.cc/66E8R9QA].
157. See generally Thom, 967 N.W.2d at 282–83. Court declined to rule on the claim that
Amendment A constituted a constitutional revision rather than an amendment. See id. at
276.
158. See id.
159. Id. at 279.
160. See id. at 290 (Myren, J., dissenting) (“The majority rejects any connected object or
purpose between recreational marijuana, medical marijuana, and hemp based upon ‘their
shared biological origin from the cannabis plant and a common plan to comprehensively
regulate all products produced by’ that plant. It dismisses any such connection as
insufficient for purposes of Herried and Barnhart. But this dismissal ignores the history of
dual regulation Marihuana Tax Act of 1937.”).
161. See generally Lisa Kaczke, Industrial Hemp Becomes Legal in South Dakota After
Noem Signs Bill, ARGUS LEADER (Mar. 27, 2020, 6:33 PM), https://www.argus
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majority expresses concern about logrolling, it does not assert that voters
were actually confused.162 He states that the majority opinion “departs
from the ‘strong presumption of constitutionality’ we are to accord to
Amendment A” in rejecting the express will of the voters.163
C. Case Study: Mississippi
In 2020, voters in Mississippi overwhelmingly enacted a medical
marijuana initiative164 that resulted in not just a curtailing of voter initiative
process but its complete destruction. Although Mississippi, like Nebraska,
was one of the states to reduce penalties for marijuana possession in the
late 1970s,165 it also, like Nebraska, is among the few states to not adopt an
effective medical marijuana program or reform its marijuana laws in any
meaningful way.166 Despite decriminalization in 2018, there were almost
9,000 marijuana possession arrests comprising 44% of all the drug arrests
in the state that year.167 Black people were 2.7 times more likely than
white people to be arrested for marijuana possession.168 And because there
is no medical marijuana program, patients lack any meaningful access to
marijuana even if their physician recommends it to treat or manage serious
medical conditions.
Like the vast majority of voters throughout the United States,169
Mississippi voters support providing access to medical marijuana by a large

leader.com/story/news/politics/2020/03/27/industrial-hemp-becomes-legal-south-dakotaafter-noem-signs-bill/5058216002/ [https://perma.cc/DVK3-KWYA].
162. See Thom, 967 N.W.2d at 291 (Myren, J., dissenting) (“The majority concludes
Amendment A represents precisely the type of logrolling Article XXIII, § 1 forbids. Yet, the
majority makes no assertion that voters were misinformed about or confused by the
Amendment.”).
163. Id. (quoting Barnhart v. Herseth, 222 N.W.2d 131, 136 (S.D. 1974).
164. See, e.g., Initiative Measure #65, MISS. SEC’Y ST., https://www.sos.ms.gov
/elections-and-voting/initiative-measure-65 [https://perma.cc/BMX4-37F9] (last visited Feb.
3, 2022).
165. First offense possession of 30 grams is punishable by a $250 fine rather than jail.
See MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-29-139(c)(2)(A)(1) (2022).
166. See H.R. Res. 1231, 2014 Leg., Reg Sess. (Miss. 2014). In 2014, “Harper Grace’s
Act” was enacted approving limited quantities of cannabidiol if prescribed by a physician
but failing to provide any meaningful access to cannabis for patients. See MISS. CODE. ANN.
§ 41-29-136 (2022).
167. See ACLU, supra note 70, at 73.
168. See id.
169. See Ted Van Green, Americans Overwhelmingly Say Marijuana Should Be Legal for
Recreational
or
Medical
Use,
PEW
RSCH.
CTR.
(Apr.
16,
2021),
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2021/04/16/americans-overwhelmingly-saymarijuana-should-be-legal-for-recreational-or-medical-use/ [https://perma.cc/F694-YQY5]
(finding 91% of U.S. adults think medical marijuana should be legal).
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margin. Public opinion surveys show high bipartisan support,170 while
elected lawmakers strongly oppose or refuse to act. Thus, following the
pattern for reform employed by voters in many other states, Mississippi
voters’ only option to obtain the medical marijuana program they support is
by going directly to the ballot.
Mississippi is one of the few southern states that has a ballot process
allowing voters to directly place initiatives on the ballot.171 The process
was adopted in 1992172 through a constitutional amendment placed on the
ballot by the Legislature that succeeded with a decisive 70% of the vote.173
At this time, it was hailed as a progressive reform.174
However, qualifying an initiative for the ballot is not an easy task.
While the Mississippi Constitution did not contain a single-subject
requirement,175 it required that initiative petitions be submitted to the
Legislature to allow lawmakers to amend the proposed measure and then
place an alternative on the ballot alongside the voter initiative measure to
allow the voters to choose between the options.176 Additionally, an
initiated constitutional amendment required at least 12% of the total
number of votes cast for the governor in the last gubernatorial general
election immediately preceding the signature deadline, and the signatures
were required to be distributed evenly across the state among each
congressional district.177

170. See Justin Dixon, Survey Finds 81% of Mississippians Support Medical Cannabis
Legalization, WLBT (Sept. 2, 2020, 2:33 PM), https://www.wlbt.com/2020/09/02/
mississippians-support-medical-marijuana-survey-finds/ [https://perma.cc/RA2Y-AMB7].
Measure 1 and Amendment A, the medical marijuana questions on the ballot in 2020,
passed with over 68% and 73% of the vote, respectively. See Mississippi Ballot Measure 1,
Initiative 65 and Alternative 65A, Medical Marijuana Amendment (2020), BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/Mississippi_Ballot_Measure_1,_Initiative_65_and_Alternative_65A,
_ Medical_Marijuana_Amendment_(2020) [https://perma.cc/K4LB-YFEC] (last visited
Feb. 3, 2022).
171. Arkansas and Florida have voter-initiated ballot measure processes, but South
Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Louisiana, Kentucky, Tennessee, North Carolina, West
Virginia, and Texas do not. See Amending State Constitutions, BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/Amending_state_constitutions#initiated_amendments
[https://perma.cc/Z8TD-7QUL] (last visited Feb. 3, 2022).
172. Mississippi had previously had an initiative process that the state supreme court
invalidated in 1922. See Mississippi, INITIATIVE & REFERENDUM INST.,
http://www.iandrinstitute.org/states/state.cfm?id=13 [https://perma.cc/D5X3-25YM] (last
visited Feb. 3, 2022).
173. See id.
174. See id.
175. See MISS. CONST., art. XV, § 273.
176. See id. art. XV, § 273(7)–(8).
177. See id. art. XV, § 273(3).
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Under the leadership of State Representative Joel Bomgar, a political
committee named “Medical Marijuana 2020” was created to launch a
campaign to enact a constitutional amendment to allow patients with a
recommendation from their physician to use and access medical marijuana
under state law.178 Over the course of a year, the campaign collected and
submitted over 214,000 signatures and Initiative 65 qualified for the
ballot.179
Initiative 65’s180 substance was similar to many of the medical
marijuana initiatives enacted by voters in other states, including those that
amended various state constitutions.181 It established protections for
qualifying patients to access limited amounts of medical marijuana for
specific medical conditions upon the recommendation of a physician and
directed the Mississippi Department of Health to implement and regulate a
medical marijuana program that would include patient identification cards

178. See Protect Our Vote Initiative 65 for Medical Marijuana, MED. MARIJUANA 2020,
https://www.medicalmarijuana2020.com/ [https://perma.cc/AYQ9-7XHN] (last visited Feb.
3, 2022); see also Wyatt Emmerich, A Sensible Argument for Medical Marijuana in
Mississippi, YAZOO HERALD (Jan. 23, 2020, 2:57 PM), https://www.yazooherald.net/opinion
-columnists/sensible-argument-medical-marijuana-mississippi#sthash.RoLN1MEk.dpbs
[https://perma.cc/4444-DQJ2].
179. See Kyle Jaeger, Medical Marijuana Measure Officially Qualifies for Mississippi
2020 Ballot, MARIJUANA MOMENT (Jan. 8, 2020), https://www.marijuana
moment.net/medical-marijuana-measure-officially-qualifies-for-mississippi-2020-ballot/
[https://perma.cc/TA4Y-83RG].
180. Initiative 65 appeared on the Mississippi 2020 General Election ballot. See Initiative
Measure #65, MISS. SEC’Y ST., https://www.sos.ms.gov/elections-and-voting/initiativemeasure-65 [https://perma.cc/9JAP-3WJ5] (last visited Feb. 3, 2022).
181. See Arkansas Medical Marijuana Amendment (2016), BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/Arkansas_Medical_Marijuana_Amendment,_Issue_6_(2016)
[https://perma.cc/MYK2-Z6UU] (last visited Feb. 3, 2022) (Arkansas’s Issue 6, a ballot
initiative, was approved by 53% of state voters in 2016); Colorado Medical Use of
Marijuana,
Initiative
20
(2000),
BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/
Colorado_Medical_Use_of_Marijuana,_Initiative_20_(2000) [https://perma.cc/8NZJ-32PR]
(last visited Feb. 3, 2022) (Colorado’s Amendment 20, an initiative, passed with 54% of the
vote in 2000); Florida Medical Marijuana Legalization Amendment 2 (2016), BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/Florida_Medical_Marijuana_Legalization,_Amendment_2_(2016)
[https://perma.cc/AJE6-WGEP] (last visited Feb. 3, 2022) (Florida’s Amendment 2 was
approved by 71% of the electorate in 2016); Missouri Amendment 2, Medical Marijuana
and
Veteran
Healthcare
Services
Initiative
(2018),
BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/Missouri_Amendment_2,_
Medical_Marijuana_and_Veteran_Healthcare_Services_Initiative_(2018)
[https://perma.cc/J3GL-WFZZ] (last visited Feb. 3, 2022) (Missouri’s Amendment 2,
enacted with 66% of the popular vote in 2018); Nevada Marijuana Legalization, Question 2
(2016),
BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/Nevada_Marijuana_Legalization,_
Question_2_(2016) [https://perma.cc/49YZ-W8CH] (last visited Feb. 3, 2022) (Nevada’s
Question 2, first endorsed by 65 % of voters in 1998).
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and registration, licensing, and oversight of production and distribution.182
The Legislature then chose, in accordance with the process, to place an
alternative medical marijuana initiative (Alternative 65A) on the ballot183
along with Initiative 65 presumably either to confuse voters, offer voters a
more modest reform, or to split the vote — since the Legislature could have
enacted a medical marijuana law legislatively at any time, but chose not
to.184
Many elected leaders expressed strong opposition to Initiative 65.
Governor Tate Reeves tweeted days before the election: “There are good
folks on all sides of the medical marijuana debate. Most non-stoners say
we should be careful & deliberate. Initiative 65 is the opposite. Experts
say it would mean the most liberal weed rules in the U.S.! Pot shops
everywhere — no local authority.”185 Many of Mississippi’s health
associations, including the Mississippi State Board of Health186 and the
Mississippi State Medical Association, also opposed the measure.187
Initiative 65 and Measure 65A188 appeared on the ballot together in
November 2020. The ballot was structured so that voters first decided yes
or no as to whether they wanted medical marijuana and then choose

182. See Medical Marijuana, MISS. SEC’Y ST., https://www.sos.ms.gov/elections/
initiatives/InitiativeInfo.aspx?IId=65 [https://perma.cc/A3HF-F8LJ] (last visited Feb. 3,
2022).
183. See Matt Harrison, Mississippi Ballot Initiative Analysis: Initiative 65 and
Alternative 65A (2020), REASONS FOUND. (Oct. 1, 2020), https://reason.org/votersguide/mississippi-ballot-initiative-analysis-initiative-65-and-alternative-65a-2020/
[https://perma.cc/LF8C-93Y7].
184. See Bobby Harrison, Two Medical Marijuana Proposals Will Be on November
Ballot, Some Believe Resulting in Confusion, MISS. TODAY (Mar. 13, 2020),
https://mississippitoday.org/2020/03/13/two-medical-marijuana-proposals-will-be-onnovember-ballot-some-believe-resulting-in-confusion/
[https://perma.cc/SGX5-2LMR]
(“Supporters of the medical marijuana initiative say the legislative alternative is designed to
confuse the voters and result in the defeat of both.”).
185. Tate Reeves (@tatereeves), TWITTER (Nov. 1, 2020, 6:49 PM),
https://twitter.com/tatereeves/status/1323049483953967104?lang=en
[https://perma.cc/LD6Q-9H98]; see also Giacomo Bologna, Mississippi Leaders Told
Voters Not to Legalize Medical Marijuana. They Voted for It Anyway, CLARION LEDGER
(Nov.
11,
2020,
2:13
PM),
https://www.clarionledger.com/story/news/
politics/2020/11/11/medical-marijuana-mississippi-why-did-pass/6161855002/
[https://perma.cc/A4P5-UW34].
186. See Medical Marijuana Will Be on Mississippi’s November Ballot, WLOX (Jan. 8,
2020,
5:19
PM),
https://www.wlox.com/2020/01/08/medical-marijuana-will-bemississippis-november-ballot/ [https://perma.cc/HL2L-UWSZ].
187. See Press Release, Mississippi State Med. Ass’n, Mississippi Physicians and AMA
Urge “NO” Vote on Initiative 65, https://myemail.constantcontact.com/Mississippiphysicians-and-AMA-urge—NO—vote-on-Initiative65.html?soid=1103816735043&aid=ElF3Kl1A5VQ [https://perma.cc/86GK-DL8H] (last
visited Jan. 30, 2022).
188. See Initiative Measure #65, supra note 164.

2022]

TAKING THE INITIATIVE

589

between Initiative 65 and Measure 65A.189 On the question of whether
they wanted medical marijuana, over 65% said yes and over 73% chose
Initiative 65.190
Immediately prior to the election, however, the Mayor of the City of
Madison, Mary Hawkins Butler, filed a lawsuit challenging Initiative 65’s
certification for the ballot.191 Mayor Hawkins Butler opposed the initiative
on its substance because it limited cities’ ability to regulate the location of
medical marijuana businesses.192 However, her arguments against the
initiative in her lawsuit were purely procedural.193 The lawsuit claimed
that the initiative process set forth in the Mississippi Constitution specified
that no more than one-fifth of the signatures may come from each
congressional district.194 In 1992, when the initiative process was added to
the Constitution, Mississippi had five congressional districts.195 Following
the 2000 Census, however, the number of congressional districts in
Mississippi dropped to four.196 Thus, the initiative requirements in the
Constitution presented a mathematical impossibility as with only four
districts, more than one-fifth of the signatures must come from each.197
The state attorney general had addressed this conundrum in 2009 by
issuing a legal opinion advising initiative sponsors to continue to collect
signatures from the five old congressional districts, and this is what the
sponsors of Initiative 65 did to qualify for the ballot.198 After the 2000
Census, when the number of congressional districts was reduced from five
189. See id.
190. See Jimmie E. Gates, Medical Marijuana in Mississippi Approved with Initiative 65
Vote. Here’s What That Means, CLARION LEDGER (Nov. 4, 2020, 12:44 PM),
https://www.clarionledger.com/story/news/politics/2020/11/04/mississippi-medicalmarijuana-initiative-65-a-election-results/6035290002/ [https://perma.cc/5R3E-DNHZ]; see
also Mississippi Ballot Measure 1, Initiative 65 and Alternative 65 A, Medical Marijuana
Amendment (2020), supra note 170.
191. See In re Initiative Measure No. 65: Butler v. Watson, No. 2020-IA-01199-SCT,
2021 WL 1940821, at *1 (Miss. 2021).
192. See Associated Press, Analysis: Lawsuit Threatens Mississippi Medical Marijuana,
JACKSON FREE PRESS (Dec. 14, 2020, 12:38 PM), https://www.jacksonfree
press.com/news/2020/dec/14/analysis-lawsuit-threatens-mississippi-medical-mar/
[https://perma.cc/9PJY-NEFX].
193. See generally Butler, 2021 WL 1940821 (arguing that the Secretary of State’s
certification of Initiative Measure No. 65 was unconstitutional based on the impossibility of
satisfying the requirement that signatures be collected from five congressional districts
when Mississippi currently now has only four congressional districts).
194. See id. at *1; see also MISS. CONST. art. XV, § 273.
195. See Butler, 2021 WL 1940821, at *15.
196. See id. at *14.
197. See id. at *6 (quoting an opinion from the Attorney General Office that “[i]t would
be mathematically impossible to satisfy the requirements of Section 273 using just four
districts”).
198. Voter Initiative Law, Op. Miss. Att’y Gen., 2009 WL 367638 (2009).
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to four, two other initiatives were placed on the ballot and adopted by
voters after their proponents used the same signature collecting approach as
the sponsors of Initiative 65. Initiative 27 required voter identification at
polls, and Initiative 31 restricted the government’s ability to take land
through eminent domain. Neither initiative was challenged, leaving both as
good law.
Despite the substance of the challenge being a purely procedural issue, a
number of opponents of medical marijuana filed amicus briefs with the
Mississippi Supreme Court. They presented the court with policy-focused
arguments about what they believe to be the harms of marijuana to public
health — that it is a “gateway” drug to more illicit substances, causes loss
of IQ, and leads to mental health disorders199 — and asked the court to
invalidate the initiative process based on these policy grounds.200 These
were the same policy arguments that opponents made against Initiative 65
during the campaign that were overwhelmingly rejected by the voters.
On May 14, 2021, the Mississippi Supreme Court determined that
Initiative 65 was improperly placed before the voters for failure to satisfy
the initiative distribution requirement and, in the process, invalidated the
people’s right to an initiative in the state constitution. The court held that:
Whether with intent, by oversight, or for some other reason, the drafters
of section 273(3) wrote a ballot-initiative process that cannot work in a
world where Mississippi has fewer than five representatives in Congress.
To work in today’s reality, it will need amending — something that lies
beyond the power of the Supreme Court.201

A scathing pair of dissenting opinions pointed out the five congressional
districts continue to exist in Mississippi statute — “Just crack open the
Mississippi Code. Section 23-15-1037 is still right there on the books, and
the five districts remain unchanged”202 — and can be employed to satisfy
the constitutionally mandated distribution requirement.203
Justice

199. See Frank Corder, Amicus Briefs Pile Up in Support of Madison Mayor’s Case
Against Medical Marijuana Initiative 65, Y’ALL POL. (Dec. 16, 2020),
https://yallpolitics.com/2020/12/16/amicus-briefs-pile-up-in-support-of-madison-mayorscase-against-medical-marijuana-initiative-65/ [https://perma.cc/2MRM-TXEJ].
200. See id.; see also Brief for Mississippi Sheriff’s Ass’n as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioner at 2, Butler, 2021 WL 1940821 (No. 2020-IA-01199-SCT) (“Marijuana is already
the most used illicit drug in the United States and increased usage will have a corresponding
effect of increased addiction. Data suggests marijuana use among adolescents is linked to a
decline in IQ as well as potential mental health problems. This lack of a complete
understanding of the impacts of the above, make it imprudent to legalize medical
marijuana.”).
201. Butler, 2021 WL 1940821, at *12.
202. Id. at *15 (Maxwell, J., dissenting).
203. See generally id.
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Maxwell’s dissent asserts that the court’s holding allows an issue solely
involving federal congressional elections to “somehow unintentionally
destroy[] Mississippi’s constitutional citizen-based ballot-initiative
process”204 and assumes a “legislative incompetence or malevolence and/or
a desire of the people to put a selfdestruct [sic] sequence into the initiative
process they granted unto themselves.”205
While the position of the court on the policy behind Initiative 65 is
unknown, the legal analysis employed by the majority, as pointed out in the
dissent, stretched credibility. Were the court aiming to save the Mississippi
Constitution from being amended to include medical marijuana, they
destroyed a piece of it in the process.206
CONCLUSION
Democracy is under assault in numerous ways, with some methods of
attack receiving less attention and being met with less alarm than others.
The ballot initiative process is one way for voters to engage directly in
lawmaking by circumventing their elected representatives and directly
deciding what laws to adopt or reject. In recent years, although not always,
voters are acting to adopt more progressive policies than their elected
representatives’ support. Lawmakers in various states are also striking
back to preserve their own power by restricting voters’ ability to legislate.
This is the case with marijuana law reform. Voters and legislators
simply disagree, making it a prime candidate for direct democracy. And
over the past 30 years — at the municipal and then at the state level — the
voters have repeatedly prevailed.
However, as the case studies here show, it is now conservative state
courts that are doing the circumventing, twisting the doctrine of the
initiative process in absurd ways to thwart the will of the voters on
marijuana reform and halt its progress. It may be that this is really about
marijuana and an entrenched institutional fear of departing from the status
quo. But, as seen in Mississippi, the collateral damage of the hostility to
marijuana reform is destroying direct democracy itself.
Those who see the initiative process as an important vehicle for
democratic advancement and values would do well to pay attention to these
otherwise obscure state supreme court rulings. These rulings likely only

204. Id. at *13.
205. Id. at *19.
206. As of February 2022, Mississippi just adopted a medical cannabis law. See M. Tae
Phillips, Mississippi Approves Medical Marijuana: What a Long, Strange Trip It’s Been,
NAT’L L. REV. (Feb. 9, 2022), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/mississippi-approvesmedical-marijuana-what-long-strange-trip-it-s-been [https://perma.cc/2UF2-JREX].
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represent a bump in the road towards the eventual full legalization of
marijuana, but the damage to democracy will be lasting.

